 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Aldworth Co. v. England9/28/2005
-5-21.
4. Keystone first argues that Barron was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time he left his truck and assaulted Mrs. England. Despite a suggestion from the trial court that "defendants quite often move for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case," however, counsel for Keystone never moved for a directed verdict on the issue whether Barron was acting within the scope of his employment after he pulled into the gas station. Nor did Keystone object to the verdict form as it went out to the jury. Instead, Keystone did not raise the issue until its motion for new trial, in which it asserted only that the award of compensatory and punitive damages was "contrary to evidence."
As we have held in Division 3 above, where a party fails to make or timely to renew a motion for directed verdict, that party cannot complain on appeal that the factfinder had no right to consider the issue involved as a matter of law. See Bell, supra, 230 Ga. App. at 828 (3). Since Keystone failed to move for a directed verdict on the issue whether it could be held liable for Barron's actions after leaving his truck or to object to the verdict form presenting the issue to the jury, we must affirm the trial court's denial of Keystone's motion for j.n.o.v. on this ground. Id.; Lincoln v. Tyler, 258 Ga. App. 374, 376 (1) (574 SE2d 440) (2002).
Even if we were to hold that Barron left the scope of his employment when he exited his truck (see, e.g., New Madison South Ltd. Partnership v. Gardner, 231 Ga. App. 730, 732-733 (1) (499 SE2d 133) (1998)), Keystone's failure to move for a directed verdict on this issue allowed the jury to find that Barron was acting within the scope at some point between the time he first crossed into the Englands' lane and the time he left the gas station. Since there was therefore some evidence to support the jury's verdict that Barron was acting within the scope of his employment during the entire altercation with the Englands, we must deny Keystone's motion for new trial as well. See Williamson, supra, 263 Ga. App. at 433 (1).
5. Keystone next contends that there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that it acted with a specific intent to cause harm, and that it therefore could not be assessed punitive damages in excess of $250,000. See OCGA ยง 51-12-5.1 (f). Again, however, Keystone neither moved for a directed verdict on the issue of its specific intent to cause harm nor objected to the verdict form putting that issue before the jury. Thus Keystone has waived any objections it may have had concerning this issue on appeal. Bell, supra, 230 Ga. App. at 828 (3).
6. Finally, Keystone contends that the trial court erred when it denied its motions for new trial and to supplement the record concerning New Jersey's statutory cap limiting damages against an insured to $300,000. See NJSA 17:30A-8 (a) (1). Once again, however, Keystone failed to move for any kind of directed verdict on damages, including this limitation under New Jersey law. Thus it has waived the issue on appeal. Bell, supra, 230 Ga. App. at 828 (3).
Judgments affirmed. Blackburn, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Georgia Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|