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Richards v. Anderson Erickson Dairy Co.7/8/2005
e proper under Iowa Code section 616.17 where alleged injury was "triggered").
C. Iowa Code § 616.8
To show venue was proper in Johnson County, the plaintiffs cite another special venue statute, Iowa Code section 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code § 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code § 616.8 (2001). It provides:
An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies . . . in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated.
Iowa Code § 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a "line of . . . cars" for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semi-trucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent).
The Richards contend section 616.8, like section 616.18, falls within the "except as otherwise provided" language of section 616.17 and thereby authorized venue in Johnson County. Prior precedent holds otherwise. We were presented with similar facts and identical statutes in 1926 and held our common carrier statute did not fall within the exception to the general venue statute. For this reason, today we hold venue was not proper in Johnson County and affirm the district court.
Nickell I
In Nickell v. District Court ("Nickell I"), the plaintiff was killed when his automobile collided with a train in Wayne County. 202 Iowa 408, 409, 210 N.W. 563, 563 (1926). His estate sued the railroad and its engineer in Clarke County. Id. The railroad was an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. Id. The engineer was a resident of Appanoose County. Id. The railroad had routes in Wayne, Clarke, and Appanoose Counties. Id.
The engineer filed a motion to change venue to Appanoose County. Id. The plaintiff resisted the motion. Id. The plaintiff claimed Iowa's common carrier statute fit within the "except otherwise provided" language of the general venue statute and therefore permitted him to sue both the railroad and the engineer anywhere the railroad had tracks in the state. Id. at 410, 210 N.W. at 563. It is important to note that notwithstanding the passage of time, the general venue and common carrier statutes in Nickell I, although renumbered, are identical to those in the case at bar. Compare Iowa Code §§ 11041, 11049 (1924), with Iowa Code §§ 616.8, .17 (2001).
The district court denied the engineer's motion, but on appeal we reversed. We held "the exception provided for in [the general venue statute] does not cover the conditions provided for in [the common carrier statute]." Nickell I, 202 Iowa at 411, 210 N.W. at 564. We further held that because the railroad was not a resident of Clarke County, the district court properly granted the engineer's motion for a change of venue to the county of his residence. Id.
Our holding in Nickell I was premised upon a distinction between suability and residence. Id. at 410-11, 210 N.W. at 563-64. Even though the common carrier statute rendered the railroad suable anywhere it had tracks, that did not make it a resident of all those counties for purposes of a co-defendant Iowa resident's motion for a change of venue predicated u
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