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Nixon v. State9/30/2005
1965 that only "claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963" were included in the waiver of immunity, the legislature meant to bar liability for torts committed prior to January 1, 1963. There was no intent for the discovery rule to apply in the event a party was not aware that a tort had been committed or was unaware of the resulting injury. This concept had not yet been recognized in Iowa outside the specific exceptions and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, and there was no indication the legislature would have wanted to apply the discovery rule beyond these exceptions.
Of course, the retroactivity provision was repealed in 1969, and since that time, the only mechanism under the act to govern the time limitation for the filing of a claim was the two-year statute of limitations under section 25A.13. The majority asserts that the repeal means the statute must be treated as if it never existed, and any intent the provision may have expressed when enacted is no longer valid. This view, of course, permits the majority to use the statute of limitations as a means to resolve the dispute freed from all the history behind the statute that unmistakably expresses an intent to exclude appellees' claim. Yet, the repeal of a statute does not simply erase the slate. Instead, our role is to discern the intent of the legislature behind the repeal, not assume it has a single meaning under all circumstances. The act of repealing a statute has no value in the analysis without determining the intent of the legislature behind the repeal.
Any claim that our legislature intended to capture plaintiff's claim by repealing the retroactive provision in 1969 cannot withstand scrutiny. Such an argument is not only speculative, but it is based upon the faulty premise that our legislature would have read Chrischilles to broadly transform the concept of accrual to incorporate the discovery rule, was aware of the trend in other states to broadly apply the discovery rule prior to Chrischilles, and intended to apply the discovery rule in 1969. Such propositions find no support under any legitimate analysis.
As mentioned, Chrischilles was not a broad pronouncement, and we did not extend the discovery rule to the statute of limitations under the Iowa Tort Claims Act until 1994. See Vachon, 514 N.W.2d at 445 (holding the discovery rule applies to all claims under the Act). Without some clear legislative expression, it cannot be discerned that our legislature intended to take the lead in our development of the legal principles surrounding the accrual of a cause of action, instead of following its past action of developing exceptions. Moreover, had the legislature intended to take the lead in making this important change in the law, it would not have done so in the ambiguous, indirect manner of repealing of the retroactivity provision. Additionally, the only written legislative history shows the legislature repealed the retroactive provision because it was "no longer necessary," which provides no real guidance either way. See Explanation of S.F. 376, 63d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 1969) (" he proposed amendment also deleted the last sentence of section 25A.2(5) which is no longer necessary in view of the statute of limitations set forth in section 25A.13"). Our legislature meticulously carved out specific exceptions when it wanted to adopt the discovery rule, and I do not think the legislature would have adopted the discovery rule to the retroactive provision under the Iowa Tort Claims Act without making a similar clear expression of intent.
In partially abrogating sovereign immunity in 1965, I would conclude our legislature did not intend to apply the discovery rule to the retroactivity provision o
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