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Nixon v. State9/30/2005
stale claims based on conduct predating January 1, 1963.
1. Principles Guiding Proper Analysis of Retroactivity Provision
It is helpful at the outset to review pertinent rules of statutory interpretation so a proper focus can be maintained in analyzing the meaning of this statute. The polestar in interpreting the act is the legislature's intent. State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa 1999). As common sense would suggest, in determining legislative intent, the court "focuses attention on circumstances and events at the time when a bill was enacted." 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 49:01, at 8 (6th ed. 2000 rev.) (emphasis added) [hereinafter "Statutes and Statutory Construction"]; accord Dann, 591 N.W.2d at 638 (stating "that, in construing a statute, the court must be mindful of the state of the law when it was enacted" (emphasis added)); Brady v. City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1993) (stating "contemporary circumstances" may be used as an aid to interpretation (emphasis added)); 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 117, at 326 (2001) ("Statutes are to be read in the light of attendant conditions at the time of their enactment."); Iowa Code § 4.6(2) (2003) (instructing court to consider " he circumstances under which the statute was enacted" in determining legislative intent). Accordingly, we "tak into consideration the historical framework" of the statute, 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 49:01, at 8-9, and look to the state of the law existing at the time the statute was adopted, Davis v. State, 682 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Iowa 2004).
One aspect of the historical context of a statute is the accepted, contemporaneous meaning of words or phrases used in the statute. Thus, we have long held that " he legislature is presumed to know the usual meaning ascribed by the courts to language and to intend that meaning unless the context shows otherwise." State v. Shafranek, 576 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 1998) (citing cases); accord Hagen v. Texaco Ref. & Mkting., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 1995); 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 50:03, at 150 ("The interpretation of well-defined words or phrases in the common law carries over to statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter."); 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 124, at 334 (stating "words in a statute are assumed to bear their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" (emphasis added)).
Similarly, the legislature has specifically provided that a court, in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions, should consider " he common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects." Iowa Code § 4.1(4) (2003). These resources are pertinent because " t is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter." 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51:02, at 176; accord State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996) (in interpreting statutory language court may consider similar statutes); 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 150, at 353 (" f a special meaning is attached to certain words in a prior act, there is a presumption of some force that the legislature intended that they should have the same signification when used in a subsequent act in relation to the same subject matter."). In addition, "the interpretation of a doubtful statute may be influenced by language of other statutes which are not specifically related, but which apply to similar persons, things, or relationships." 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 53:03, at 327-38; accord Hagen, 526 N.W.2d at 536 (applying case law interpretation of same language used in other, unrelated statutes). Having established that the state of th
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