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State v. Sanders11/23/2005
cquire such actual knowledge. Hence a requirement of actual knowledge of injury would realistically render the statute useless. We therefore believe that criminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.
Miller, 308 N.W.2d at 7. This rule was followed in State v. Carpenter, 334 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1983). There, the court stated that "it is only necessary that the driver know or be reasonably charged with knowledge that the person has been injured." Id. at 141.
Sanders argues that the State failed to prove the predicate fact that he knew or should have known he hit a person, let alone his knowledge of the likelihood that a person was injured. We believe Sanders's attempted distinction of these facts makes no difference in the view of the evidence in this case.
There is evidence from four other motorists who encountered Shattuck on the highway near the accident scene, indicating they recognized Shattuck as a person. Their testimony, in addition to Sanders's incriminatory statements and fear based decision not to stop after striking Shattuck supports the jury's implicit finding that he knew or could be reasonably charged with knowledge that a person was injured. We affirm on this issue.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Turning to Sanders's argument that his counsel was ineffective, we review his claim de novo. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1999). To show counsel was ineffective, Sanders must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted therefrom. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001); State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999). "The ultimate test for determining whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is whether, considering the entire record and all of the circumstances, the attorney's performance was within the range of normal competency." State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995) (citing Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984)). Sanders must overcome the presumption "that counsel is competent and that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d at 739 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693-94).
"Generally, we do not resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal." State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002) (citing State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1997)) "Rather, we preserve such claims for post-conviction relief proceedings, where an adequate record of the claim can be developed and the attorney charged with providing ineffective assistance may have an opportunity to respond to defendant's claims." Id.
Sanders maintains that his counsel failed to perform an essential duty by not filing a motion to suppress his incriminatory statements made to the investigator. Sanders asserts that his statements made to the police should have been suppressed because the police continued to question him after he requested counsel. Sanders further claims that his statements to the police prejudiced him because they tended to undermine his theory that he lacked knowledge as to what he hit. Because the record is not sufficient to resolve these issues, we preserve them for post-conviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
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