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Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Tucker11/23/2005
er or not a tort or wrong had been committed, or to determine a liability due to breach of contract.
Ennis, 72 Idaho at 184, 238 P.2d at 439-40. The court cited Country Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Development, Inc., 107 Idaho 961, 972, 695 P.2d 346, 357 (1984) as having forewarned that "the Declaratory Judgment Act is not a freeway open for the litigation of factual disputes." The court then responded to FIE's argument that Sweeney v. American National Bank, 62 Idaho 544, 115 P.2d 109 (1944), mandated the district court to allow the amendment by stating:
Sweeney was decided prior to Ennis and cited therein. While Sweeney seems to be overruled by Ennis, it was not. However, Ennis was decided last and its holding is clear that declaratory judgment actions are not proper remedies where the main issue is the determination of an issue of fact. To this Court, it seems that Ennis, and other cases citing it, prefer a court to allow a jury trial on issues of fact in a regular action rather than decide those issues in a declaratory judgment action.
The district court's conclusion is in keeping with this Court's ruling in Country Ins. Co., wherein we held that a declaratory judgment should not be allowed "where the questions presented should be the subject of judicial investigation in a regular action."
The court then addressed FIE's contention that it should be allowed to litigate the damage issue in the Idaho action because it had filed its action first. The court acknowledged that the Idaho action had been filed first but noted that Tucker and Hoctor had filed their second complaint in Montana before FIE filed to amend its complaint in Idaho. The court cited the following language from Scott v. Agricultural Products Corp., Inc., 102 Idaho 147, 150, 627 P.2d 326, 329 (1981):
There does exist authority for the proposition . . . that where the commencement of the declaratory judgment action precedes the request for traditional relief, the motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action should be denied. (citations omitted) However, there exists an equally strong line of authority which rejects the application of such a categorical rule. (citations omitted) The latter line of authority appears to be the better view, and the court is in agreement with Moore's observation in his treatise on Federal Practice that:
'The efficacy of the declaratory remedy would be subverted by a strict adherence to any such ironclad dogma. Since admittedly discretion rather than jurisdiction is at issue, the effect to be ascribed to the pendency of another action should be determined by broad principles of convenience, expediency and efficiency -- and not by the enunciation of rules of thumb.' Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 6A section 57.08 (2d ed.1974).
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the court found that allowing the action in Montana to continue as to the amount of damage that Tucker and Hoctor may be able to collect from FIE would promote efficiency and expediency.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. The court clearly perceived the issue as one of discretion, as evidenced by its observation that the decision was "discretionary." The district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion when it specifically found that there was no authority supporting the position of FIE that it should be able to maintain a declaratory judgment action to determine damages when there was a wrongful death and survivorship action pending in Montana designed to address that very issue. The district court's legal analysis is well reasoned and sound.
FIE's argument admittedly has some initial curb appeal. It asserts the rem
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