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Arthur v. Catour7/21/2005
ture of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him." Restatement (Second) of Torts §920A, Comment b, at 514 (1979).
The majority opinion, however, fails to acknowledge that Illinois departs from other jurisdictions with respect to application of the collateral source rule. In its opinion, the majority omits any discussion with respect to our decision in Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill. 2d 353 (1979), wherein this court limited the operation of the collateral source rule. See Muranyi v. Turn Verein Frisch-Auf, 308 Ill. App. 3d 213, 216 (1999) (Peterson "rejected th unconditional version of the collateral source rule"); see also 11 Ill. Jur. Personal Injury & Torts §5:62 (2002); M. Pollelle & B. Ottley, Illinois Tort Law §24.13 (3d ed. 2000).
In Peterson, this court denied the plaintiff recovery for the value of medical services a charitable hospital had rendered to his son free of charge, reasoning that the policy behind the collateral source rule is not applicable "if the plaintiff has incurred no expense, obligation, or liability in obtaining the services for which he seeks compensation ." Peterson, 76 Ill. 2d at 362. In arriving at this holding, this court stated that " e refuse to join those courts which, without consideration of the facts of each case, blindly adhere to `the collateral source rule, permitting the plaintiff to exceed compensatory limits in the interest of insuring an impact upon the defendant.' " Peterson, 76 Ill. 2d at 363, quoting Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 742 (1964). The Peterson court highlighted the tension between the concept of compensatory damages and the collateral source rule, observing that the purpose of compensatory damages is to "compensate," and not "to punish defendants or bestow a windfall upon plaintiffs." Peterson, 76 Ill. 2d at 363. Accordingly, this court held that " he view that a windfall, if any is to be enjoyed, should go to the plaintiff [citation] borders too closely on approval of unwarranted punitive damages, and it is a view not espoused by our cases." Peterson, 76 Ill. 2d at 363.
With our decision in Peterson, Illinois became one of the few jurisdictions to apply a limited version of the collateral source rule to exclude gratuities from the operation of the rule. See 2 D. Dobbs, Remedies §8.6(3), at 494 (2d ed. 1993) (recognizing Illinois as one of a few jurisdictions omitting gratuities from the collateral source rule and noting that in this view "the collateral source rule applies only to benefits the plaintiff has obtained by purchase or his own efforts"); 4 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, Torts §25.9, at 561 n.8 (2d ed. 1986) (listing Illinois as one of a few jurisdictions excluding gratuities from the collateral source rule); 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §397, at 359-60 (2003) (same).
It is against the backdrop of our restrictive interpretation of the collateral source rule that the trial court certified the question presented in the instant appeal. In its order granting partial summary judgment to defendants, the circuit court found our decision in Peterson to be controlling, and quoted our holding from that decision that the purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate a plaintiff and not to punish defendants or bestow a windfall upon a plaintiff. It was based upon this language in Peterson that the circuit court held that because plaintiff in the matter at bar was only liable for the discounted amount of her medical expenses, this discounted amount was the appropriate measure of her medical expense damages. The record further reveals that it was on this issue that the circuit court fo
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