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Arthur v. Catour7/21/2005
und that there was substantial ground for difference of opinion, and certified the question for appeal.
Upon reviewing the judgment of the circuit court, the appellate court addressed two issues. First, the appellate court majority held that plaintiff was entitled to recover medical expense damages in an amount greater than the amount she was obligated to pay, and any additional amount would not be a "windfall" because the difference is a benefit of plaintiff's contract with her insurer, not one bestowed upon her by defendants. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 806. Second, a majority of the appellate court panel rejected defendants' assertion that the difference between the amount charged and the amount paid is "illusory" and not subject to the collateral source rule. The appellate majority held that limiting plaintiff's damages to the amount actually paid as a result of her insurance contract violated the purpose of the collateral source rule because such a limitation would confer a significant benefit of plaintiff's insurance coverage upon defendants. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 807.
Before this court, the parties engage in extensive argument with respect to the relationship between compensatory damages and the collateral source rule, as well as the extent of the limitation of the collateral source rule in our jurisdiction. According to defendants, although the collateral source rule affords protection to medical payments made under plaintiff's insurance policy, this protection is not without limits. Defendants contend that because the amount of plaintiff's medical expenses is reduced by the amount of the discount, and because neither plaintiff nor anyone else has liability for the discounted amount, the collateral source rule should not apply to protect the discounted amount. According to defendants, under circumstances such as those at bar, application of the collateral source rule serves to protect an unjustified windfall to plaintiff. In addition, defendants argue that allowing plaintiff to recover a compensatory award in excess of the medical expenses actually incurred is similar to imposing an impermissible penalty upon them.
In response, plaintiff contends that the usual rule that a paid bill is prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the expenses does not apply here because the collateral source rule prevents the jury from learning any information with respect to plaintiff's procurement of insurance, including any discounting of medical expenses attributable to agreements between the insurance companies and plaintiff's medical care providers. Therefore, plaintiff argues, the nondiscounted amount billed by the medical-care providers is the appropriate measure of damages. Plaintiff further contends that our decision in Peterson does not support defendants' arguments.
Instead of addressing the specific questions presented in this appeal, as framed by the circuit court in its order, the appellate court in its opinion, and the parties in their briefs, the majority focuses its analysis upon the "dual nature of the collateral source rule." Slip op. at 5. The majority explains that the collateral source rule has a substantive and evidentiary component, and holds that the certified question in this case implicates only the evidentiary component of the collateral source rule. According to the majority, the "only relevant question in the litigation between plaintiff and defendants is the reasonable value of the services rendered" (slip op. at 7), and that the certified question merely asks whether certain evidence is admissible in such cases. By framing the question presented in this way, the majority avoids addressing the circuit court's order granting partial summary judgment to defend
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