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Arthur v. Catour7/21/2005
ef that the majority's opinion will only further confuse the bench and bar on these already confusing issues.
The instant appeal presents a number of important legal principles and public policy concerns that require thoughtful analysis by this court. The last time this court spoke on the tension between the concept of compensatory damages and the operation of the collateral source rule was in 1979-over 25 years ago-in Peterson. In that case, we delivered several strong statements with respect to this tension, and, as a result, became one of the few jurisdictions to limit the scope of the collateral source rule. Since 1979, the medical marketplace has drastically changed. For example, today, the discounting of medical bills is a common practice in the health-care field. Mitchell v. Hayes, 72 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Va. 1999); see M. Beard, The Impact of Changes in Health Care Provider Reimbursement Systems on the Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in Personal Injury Suits, 21 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 453 (1998). I believe that this case presents this court with the important opportunity to decide whether to specifically delineate the limitations previously imposed on the collateral source rule in Peterson, or to hold that Illinois will now join the majority of jurisdictions that apply a pure collateral source rule. Indeed, if Illinois were to join the majority of other states on this issue, there would be no dispute with respect to whether the charged or the paid bill would be the appropriate measure of damages-it would be clear that the charged bill would be the only evidence to be admissible.
I wish to make abundantly clear that I do not suggest which alternative this court should adopt. I note, however, that a clear-cut rule benefits the parties and the court because it limits discovery, eliminates unneeded confusion and complexity in trials, promotes predictability and conserves scarce judicial resources. The court should take this opportunity to clarify the scope and extent of the collateral source rule in Illinois . The majority omits discussion of Peterson and the unique way that the collateral source rule is treated in this state, and has, instead, relied on general treatise or hornbook quotations, which speak to the general treatment of the collateral source rule, rather than to the unique way that it has developed in Illinois.
In sum, unlike the majority, I would address the question presented by this appeal, which involves an examination of this court's opinion in Peterson and the conflict between the principles of compensatory damages and the collateral source rule. In avoiding the important issues squarely presented by this appeal, the majority creates a new evidentiary procedure that represents a major change in trial practice, and which appears to be unworkable. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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