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Arthur v. Catour7/21/2005
vices rendered? The majority gives an answer that amounts to no answer at all. The majority opinion crafts an unworkable analytical framework and arrives at a holding that represents a major change in trial practice. It is my position that such a significant alteration should be approached carefully, and only after this court has had the benefit of input from the bench and bar affected by the change. This has not occurred in the instant matter. The majority opinion compromises the traditional protections afforded by the collateral source rule and may necessitate a trial within a trial whenever the reasonableness of a plaintiff's medical expenses are at issue. Because the majority's analysis of the issues presented in this case is inadequate, and because the majority's holding dramatically changes trial practice with respect to this issue, I cannot join in the majority opinion. I express no opinion on the ultimate disposition of the issue presented in this appeal.
It is well settled under our precedent that " he purpose of compensatory tort damages is to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries, not to punish defendants or bestow a windfall upon plaintiffs." Wilson v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 321 (1989); see also Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 406 (1997) ("There is universal agreement that the compensatory goal of tort law requires that an injured plaintiff be made whole"); Restatement (Second) of Torts §903, Comment a (1979) ("compensatory damages are designed to place [a plaintiff] in a position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which [plaintiff] would have occupied had no tort been committed"). In cases, such as that at bar, where a plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages for health-care expenses, it has long been held that a plaintiff must prove two things: "First, that the [plaintiff] has paid or become liable to pay a specific amount; and second, that the charges made were reasonable charges for services of that nature." Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 319 Ill. 344, 349 (1925); see also Gill v. Foster, 232 Ill. App. 3d 768, 790-91 (1992); Barreto v. City of Waukegan, 133 Ill. App. 3d 119, 130 (1985); Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 30.06 (2005) (plaintiff is entitled to recover from a tortfeasor " he reasonable expense of necessary medical care, treatment, and services received"); 11 Ill. Jur. Personal Injury & Torts §5:22 (2002).
Where a bill for health-care services has been paid, the payment of the bill constitutes prima facie evidence that the bill is reasonable. Wicks, 319 Ill. at 349; M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §803.22 (8th ed. 2004); 1 R. Hunter, Trial Handbook for Illinois Lawyers, Civil §21.38 (7th ed. 1997); cf. Victory Memorial Hospital v. Rice, 143 Ill. App. 3d 621, 624 (1986) ("evidence of the amount charged alone does not indicate reasonableness"). There are at least two rationales for this well-settled rule. First, the presumption that the amount of a paid bill is reasonable derives from the long- standing principle that the free and voluntary payment of a charge for a service by a consumer shows the reasonable or fair market value of that service. Wicks, 319 Ill. at 349; see Lanquist v. City of Chicago, 200 Ill. 69, 73-74 (1902) (reasonableness of value may be shown by sales "made in a free and open market, and where a fair opportunity for competition exists"). In other words, " hen a bill has been paid, there is little reason to suspect that the charge is collusive or speculative." Baker v. Hutson, 333 Ill. App. 3d 486, 493-94 (2002); accord Spurr v. LaSalle, 385 F.2d 322, 329 (7th Cir. 1967) (applying Illinois law, observing: "Common sense tells us it is most improba
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