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Barragan v. Casco Design Corp.9/22/2005
no action for contribution may be commenced more than two years after service of process in the underlying suit. It also emphasizes that section 13-204 preempts all other statutes of limitation or repose. It argues that this evinces a legislative intent to override section 13-207.
We find Casco's argument to be unpersuasive. The mandatory "no action for contribution" language merely accomplishes what all statutes of limitation do-it time-bars the claim. As such, section 13-204 is not appreciably different from other statutes of limitation that have been found to be overridden by section 13-207. See, e.g., Pape, 145 Ill. 2d at 27 (section 13-207 applied to avoid the limitations bar of section 302(a)(1) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 302(a)(1))); Westbank v. Maurer, 276 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564 (1995) (section 13-207 applied to save a counterclaim despite a federal statute of limitations providing that the right to rescission "shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or sale of the property"); Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d at 511 n.3 (section 13-207 held to override statute of limitations requiring that an "action for breach of contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 26, par. 2-725)); Benckendorf, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 663 (section 13-207 applied to avoid the two-year limitations bar for personal injuries under section 13-202 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 13-202)). These cases demonstrate that it takes more than mandatory language to override the saving provision of section 13-207. As we will explain more fully below, the language enacted by the legislature in section 13-204, and relied upon by Casco, appears to have had nothing to do with a desire to preempt section 13-207 and everything to do with clarifying which of two possible statutes of limitations should control in contribution actions. Moreover, if we were to accept Casco's argument, it would void section 13-207's clear intent to negate an otherwise applicable statute of limitations when the conditions are met.
The linchpin of Casco's argument is the erroneous premise that section 13-207 is a statute of limitations. A statute of limitations is " law that bars claims after a specified period; specif., a statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued." Black's Law Dictionary 1450-51 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, a statute of limitations is by definition an arbitrary period after which all claims will be cut off. Langendorf v. City of Urbana, 197 Ill. 2d 100, 110 (2001); see also Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 391, 400 (2001) (the purpose of a statute of limitations is to prevent stale claims). Section 13-207, however, does the opposite of a statute of limitations. Instead of barring a claim after a specified period or setting a date for accrual of the claim, it saves otherwise barred claims. Section 13-207 cannot be a statute of limitations because its aim is not to bar claims, but to preserve them.
Statutes of limitation must be construed in accordance with their objectives and purposes. Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 4 Ill. 2d 273, 289 (1954). There is nothing that can be garnered from the purpose of section 13-204 to indicate that it was meant to circumvent the saving clause of section 13-207. Prior to its amendment in 1995, section 13-204 simply provided that " o action for contribution among joint tortfeasors shall be commenced with respect to any payment made in excess of a party's pro rata share more than 2 years after the party seek
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