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Barragan v. Casco Design Corp.9/22/2005
as a duty to interpret allegedly conflicting statutes in a manner that avoids inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes where possible); Jahn v. Troy Fire Protection District, 163 Ill. 2d 275, 282 (1994) (statutes must be in "direct conflict" to apply the more recently enacted statute over the earlier enacted one); Byrne v. City of Chicago, 215 Ill. App. 3d 698, 709-10 (1991) (the two principles of statutory construction at issue-that the more recently enacted and the more specific statute should take precedence-do not apply where the statutes do not actually contradict one another). Moreover, it has been specifically noted that no conflict arises when section 13-207 overrides a statute of limitations absent a clear legislative intent to prevent the applicability of 13-207, and therefore the principles of statutory construction relied upon-that the more specific and more recent statute take priority-do not apply. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d at 511-12. With respect to the two sections of the Code to be reconciled in this case, it is only after the statute of limitations bars a claim that the saving provision can step in to save it, and then only in the event that the requirements of the provision are met. This is a two-step inquiry that gives effect to both statutes. As we have previously noted, section 13-204 clearly bars contribution claims filed more than two years after service of process in the underlying suit. Section 13-207 plainly takes into account such barred claims, yet it saves them if they are responsive counterclaims, by negating the statute of limitations and allowing them to proceed. Our interpretation of the two statutes avoids any inconsistency and gives meaning and effect to both statutes, as we must do if reasonably possible. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 311-12. There is no merit to the notion that such an interpretation would render section 13-204 meaningless, as there is no question that section 13-204 bars all untimely filed actions for contribution that would seek to instigate an adversarial relationship, in contrast to actions that merely respond to one that has already been created.
The only case cited by Casco that arguably supports its position is Johnson v. Core-Vent Corp., 264 Ill. App. 3d 833 (1993), but we find that case to be distinguishable. There, a dentist and two of his patients sued the defendant, claiming that dental implants manufactured by the defendant failed after they were surgically installed. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the dentist, alleging that his negligence in installing the devices caused or contributed to the patients' injuries. The defendant's counterclaim, however, was filed beyond the four-year medical malpractice statute of repose set forth in section 13-212(a) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 13-212(a)). The appellate court found that the four-year statute of repose should be read to override section 13-207 of the Code because section 13-212(a) was more "narrow in focus" and it expressed the legislature's intent "to limit the vulnerability of health care professions from medical malpractice liability by establishing that the four-year statute of repose applied to any action, including claims for contribution." Johnson, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 837.
Johnson is distinguishable from the present case, as the same public policy concern of limiting the vulnerability of health professionals to medical malpractice claims is not present here. See Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 136 Ill. 2d 450, 461 (1990) ("the General Assembly perceived the medical malpractice insurance crisis as so grave that it limited to four years a patient's right to bring an action against certain health-care providers for damages arisi
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