 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Mydlach v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.9/30/2005
Plaintiff Lucy Mydlach brought this action against defendant DaimlerChrysler Corporation under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Act or Magnuson-Moss Act) (15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (2000)) after she purchased a used car manufactured by defendant which was allegedly defective. Plaintiff's three-count complaint alleged breach of written warranty (count I), breach of implied warranty of merchantability (count II), and revocation of acceptance (count III). Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff's claims were barred by the four-year statute of limitations included in section 2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code- -Sales (Code or UCC) (810 ILCS 5/2-725 (West 2000)). The trial court granted defendant's motion, and plaintiff now appeals, contending the trial court erred in finding that her claims were time barred. She further contends that the trial court should have recognized her claim for revocation of acceptance because the Act permits consumers to recover equitable relief.
BACKGROUND
On June 20, 1998, plaintiff bought a used 1996 Dodge Neon, manufactured by defendant, from McGrath Buick Nissan (McGrath) in Elgin, Illinois . The car was put in service to its original buyer on June 24, 1996. At that time, the car carried a 3-year/36,000-mile warranty. When plaintiff bought the car on June 20, 1998, about one year or 10,000 miles remained on the warranty.
Within approximately 17 days of buying the car, plaintiff tendered it to an authorized dealer of defendant for repairs. On July 7, 1998, she brought in the car complaining of a squealing noise in the brakes. On July 15, 1998, she brought in the car for a fluid leak. On July 24, 1998, repairs were performed for a transmission leak, a creaking noise while shifting, failure of the transaxle, and failure of the engine mounts. On July 31, 1998, the car was repaired for a leak and the failure of the drive shaft. On August 6, 1998, repairs were performed for the same problems. Finally, on August 21, 1998, the car was repaired for a rattle in the front end due to a defective tire. At the time of this repair, the car's mileage was 31,103 miles.
On May 16, 2001, plaintiff filed her three-count complaint against defendant. In count I plaintiff alleged breach of written warranty based upon the written warranty provided by defendant. The warranty states in relevant part:
"WHAT'S COVERED
*
The `Basic Warranty' covers the cost of all parts and labor needed to repair any item on your vehicle (except as noted below) that's defective in material, workmanship or factory preparation. You pay nothing for these repairs. The `Basic Warranty' covers every Chrysler supplied part of your vehicle, EXCEPT its tires and cellular telephone. * These warranty repairs or adjustments (parts and labor) will be made by your dealer at no charge using new or remanufactured parts."
Plaintiff alleged that as a result of ineffective repair attempts by defendant, she could not use the car as she had intended. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to properly diagnose a fluid leak despite seven repair attempts and alleged she was entitled to seek relief under section 2310(d)(1) of the Magnuson-Moss Act (15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (2000)).
In count II, plaintiff alleged that her car "was subject to an implied warranty of merchantability as defined in [section 2301(7) of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 2301(7) (2000))] running from [defendant] to the intended consumer, plaintiff." Plaintiff alleged that defendant breached this warranty as the defect in her car rendered it "unmerchantable and thereby not fit for the
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Illinois Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|