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Nelson v. Upadhyaya9/23/2005
ke the opinions in Kleiss v. Cassida, 297 Ill. App. 3d 165 (1998), and Dyback v. Weber, 114 Ill. 2d 232 (1986), rest on mere speculation and conjecture. In Dyback the plaintiff's expert testified that the heater the defendant left in the plaintiff's house caused a fire. Our supreme court held the opinion too speculative because the fire could have started in many other ways, and the expert did not give reasons for excluding the other possible causes. Dyback, 114 Ill. 2d at 242-43. In Kleiss, the plaintiff's expert testified that defendant's crop spray damaged the plaintiff's crops. He presented no scientific basis for the opinion. The appellate court held the expert's testimony too speculative to support a verdict for the plaintiff. Kleiss, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 174.
The expert opinions at issue here do not involve causation. The experts testified to the standard of care, basing the testimony on their personal knowledge as practitioners in 1990. They reviewed and interpreted the medical records and explained at length how the record supported their opinions that the defendants complied with the standards of care. We see no grounds for taking from the jury the question of the credibility and reliability of the expert testimony here. See Doyle v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 249 Ill. App. 3d 370, 381-82 (1993). The trial court properly rejected plaintiffs' argument that the testimony of defense experts did not adequately support the verdict in favor of defendants.
II.
Next, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by permitting defendants to use materials published after 1990 in examining witnesses about the standard of care applicable in 1990. We will not reverse a decision concerning the admissibility of evidence unless the trial court abused its discretion and the decision had prejudicial effect. Stallings v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 676, 683 (2003).
In general, "standards * not in effect on the date of the [medical treatment] * are inapplicable to establish a standard of care" for that treatment. Smith v. South Shore Hospital, 187 Ill. App. 3d 847, 856 (1989). Defendants persuaded the trial court that the general rule did not apply because defendants sought to use the later materials to show the evolution of the standard of care.
In support defendants cited Granberry v. Carbondale Clinic, S.C., 285 Ill. App. 3d 54 (1996). In that case the trial court disallowed testimony concerning articles published after the alleged medical malpractice. The appellate court reversed, holding that the court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff the opportunity to introduce evidence from postoccurrence literature concerning the operation of a diagnostic tool the defendant used. The court reasserted the general rule that the trial court should disallow use of "literature containing medical knowledge not available at the time of the alleged malpractice as evidence of deviation from the standard of care at the time of the alleged malpractice." Granberry, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 65. The court held that the general rule did not apply because the "plaintiffs were attempting to use the post-1982 medical articles to show the diagnostic capabilities of ultrasound, not to show standard of care." (Emphasis in original.) Granberry, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 65. Because defendants here used the articles at issue solely to show the standard of care, Granberry provides no support for use of the postoccurrence literature here.
In Karr v. Noel, 212 Ill. App. 3d 575 (1991), the plaintiff suffered a spider bite in 1982, and the defendant's treatment of the bite left the plaintiff disfigured. The defendant used material published after 19
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