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Corral v. Mervis Industries10/20/2005
endant's only plastic scrap broker and conducts sales for defendant from the business telephone line in his home office. Smith testified that Samson answers the business phone line in his home by saying "Mervis Plastics."
According to Smith, the only time Samson has traveled to defendant's headquarters in Danville was for his hiring interview. Smith acknowledged during his deposition that plastic scrap sales generate annual revenues of $1,500,000 to $1,750,000.
In addition to defendant's Cook County employee, defendant sells a small amount of stainless steel in Cook County. The Cook County steel sales represent less than 1% of defendant's total sales.
The order of the circuit court denying defendant's motion to transfer venue states:
"This cause coming to be heard on motion of defendant, Mervis Industries, to transfer venue; it is hereby ordered that defendant's motion is denied. This matter is set for status on the pleadings for 2/7/03 at 9:15 a.m."
The appellate court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(4). On November 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court. No. 1-03-0129 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court's order stated:
"The trial court held that Mervis had an office in Cook County, because one of Mervis's employees worked in his Cook County home. We agree with the trial court that the home office here sufficed to establish corporate residence for venue purposes."
The appellate court further concluded:
"Mervis brokered plastic scrap from an office in its employee's home in Cook County. Because Mervis had an `other office' in Cook County, the trial court correctly held that Mervis was a resident of Cook County for venue purposes."
We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant raises two issues in its appeal. First, defendant argues reviewing courts should apply a de novo standard of review to orders denying a motion to transfer venue from an improper forum when the facts are undisputed. Second, defendant argues the circuit court of Cook County erred in denying its motion to transfer venue to Vermilion County because its employee's home is not an office of defendant and, therefore, Cook County is an improper venue. We address each of defendant's arguments seriatim.
A. Standard of Review
We first examine the proper standard of review for the grant or denial of a motion to transfer based on improper venue. We begin our analysis by reviewing the venue statutes. Section 2-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2000)) generally governs venue and provides, in relevant part:
"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every action must be commenced (1) in the county of residence of any defendant who is joined in good faith and with probable cause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against him or her and not solely for the purpose of fixing venue in that county, or (2) in the county in which the transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose."
Section 2-102 of the Code specifically defines the residence of corporations and provides, in pertinent part:
"For purpose of venue, the following definitions apply:
(a) Any private corporation * organized under the laws of this State * is a resident of any county in which it has its registered office or other office or is doing business." 735 ILCS 5/2-102 (West 2000).
Defendant contends a motion to transfer to a proper venue presum
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