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Redmond v. Socha10/6/2005
Docket No. 99625-Agenda 23-May 2005.
On July 4, 2001, near the corner of Ogden Avenue and California in Chicago , the car driven by defendant/cross-plaintiff Socha collided with the rear of a motorcycle driven by plaintiff/cross-defendant Redmond, injuring Redmond and damaging Socha's car. In the litigation that followed, no evidence was presented by either party of any cause or contributing factor other than the alleged negligence of the other party. The weather was good; the pavement was dry and clean; no other vehicles were involved; and no mechanical failure caused either vehicle to malfunction. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Socha on Redmond's complaint and in favor of Redmond on Socha's counterclaim. The trial court entered judgment on the verdicts. Following a hearing on Redmond's posttrial motion, the trial court found that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence because there was no evidence of any intervening cause of the accident and, thus, it was "not logically possible to find that an accident occurred without being anyone's fault."
The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the verdicts were "irreconcilably inconsistent." 352 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1055. The appellate court rejected the approach taken by the Fourth District in a factually similar case, Barrick v. Grimes, 308 Ill. App. 3d 306 (1999). Thus, there is an apparent split of opinion among the appellate districts. We granted leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) to determine whether, in such a case, a new trial must be granted because the verdicts are legally inconsistent. We have permitted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file a brief amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiff. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
BACKGROUND
Both vehicles were traveling in the same direction when they collided. According to Redmond, he was changing lanes from the right lane to the left lane when Socha's car, which had been traveling in the right lane behind two other motorcycles, "shot" from behind the other cycles and came up behind him in the left lane. According to Socha, she was already in the left lane when Redmond swerved in front of her. In either event, she was unable to stop in time to avoid hitting him. The right front fender of her car hit the left rear of his motorcycle.
Each party alleged that the negligence of the other was the proximate cause of the accident. As noted, neither party introduced evidence of any factor that might be seen as an intervening cause. Both parties introduced evidence of damages. Redmond claimed medical expenses in excess of $25,000. Socha's claimed automobile repair costs were in excess of $7,000. Both parties raised the defense of comparative negligence.
The trial court instructed the jury according to Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. B21.04 (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. B21.04 (1995) (hereinafter IPI Civil (1995)) that, because the case involved both a claim and a counterclaim, there were four possible outcomes. The jury could find: for the plaintiff and against the defendant (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(3)), for the defendant and against the plaintiff (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(4)), against both (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(5)), or for both (IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.04(6)). The jury was further instructed that to prevail on his or her claim, each party had the burden of proving three propositions: an act or failure to act that constituted negligence, injury, and proximate cause. IPI Civil (1995) No. B21.02. In addition, the term "burden of proof" was defined for the jury in accordance with Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction No. 21.01: "When I say that a part
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