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Redmond v. Socha10/6/2005
or leave to appeal, one of the jurors specifically pointed out to the trial judge before judgment was entered that this outcome was theoretically possible and the judge acknowledged this possibility. Socha suggests, based on this exchange, that " learly, the jury intended to return the verdicts as they did, and neither the trial court nor the appellate court held otherwise."
We note, however, that the record provided to this court on appeal is incomplete. See Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 546 (1996) (as the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal is on the appellant, any doubts arising from an incomplete record must be resolved against the appellant). Because we are unable to determine from the record provided that further deliberation took place after the jury rendered its initial verdict, or, if additional deliberation did indeed take place, what instructions were given to the jury regarding the reason that further deliberation was necessary, we can give no weight to the jury's apparent reaffirmation of these verdicts.
Similarly, the purported exchange between judge and juror is not documented in the partial record provided by Socha to this court. As the record on appeal does not disclose the content of this exchange, or when or under what circumstances it took place, it cannot be considered by this court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUES PRESENTED
The parties are in disagreement regarding the standard of review that should be applied in this appeal. Acknowledging the standard applied by the appellate court, Socha cites Mizowek v. De Franco, 64 Ill. 2d 303, 310 (1976), for the proposition that a trial court may grant a new trial if the jury's verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. " ` "A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence." ' " McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132 (1999), quoting Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992), quoting Villa v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 202 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1089 (1990). Socha also acknowledges that once a trial court has applied this test and granted a new trial, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's decision to grant a motion for a new trial unless it finds that the trial court abused its discretion. McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 132-33. Further, she notes that it would be an abuse of discretion to order a new trial if a verdict were supported by sufficient evidence. Kleiss v. Cassida, 297 Ill. App. 3d 165, 175 (1998). Analogizing this "sufficient evidence" standard to the "reasonable hypothesis" standard applicable to claims of inconsistent verdicts (see Tedeschi v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 445, 448-49 (1996)), Socha asserts that a trial court abuses its discretion by granting a new trial on the basis of inconsistent verdicts if a reasonable hypothesis supports the verdicts.
She argues, however, that whether verdicts are legally inconsistent is a question of law and that the appellate court erred by not reviewing the trial court's determination on this question de novo. The case upon which she relies, P.R.S. International, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 184 Ill. 2d 224, 233-34 (1998), does indeed state that questions of law are subject to de novo review. It does not, however, involve a claim of inconsistent verdicts, so it does not provide authority for Socha's basic premise that this is a question of law.
Redmond and amicus curiae state that the authority relied upon by Socha is inapposite and that the appellate court correctly employed the abuse o
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