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Robson v. Texas Eastern Corp.8/15/2005
and the ongoing state proceedings wherein [the Plaintiff] was attempting to undo GM's termination of them.
337 F.3d at 320 (emphasis added). Because the debtor-plaintiff in Krystal Cadillac failed to indicate that its cause of action was for damages and was capable of providing income to the bankruptcy estate while the Robsons did so indicate, the case at bar is distinguishable from Krystal Cadillac.
Importantly, not a single case cited by TEC or found by this court's independent research has applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel against a debtor-plaintiff who included his claim for damages in his bankruptcy schedules-as the Robsons did in the case at bar. See Jethroe v. Omnova Solutions, Inc., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11051 at *2 (5th Cir., June 13, 2005); Baker v. Dep't of Interior, 125 Fed. Appx. 151, 152 (9th Cir. 2005); De Leon v. Comcar Indus., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003); Casey v. Peco Foods, Inc., 297 B.R. 73, 75 (S.D. Miss. 2003); Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1284; Froshiesar v. Babij, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25537 at 5 (D. Or. Dec. 11, 2002); Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2001); Chandler, 35 F.Supp.2d at 862-63; Browning Mfg. v. Mims (In re Coastal Plains), 179 F.3d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 1999); Ryan, 81 F.3d at 357; Johnson, 478 S.E.2d at 630; Hammes v. Brumley, 659 N.E.2d 1021, 1028 (Ind. 1995); Valley Fed. Sav. Bank v. Anderson, 612 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Schlosser v. Bank of W. Ind., 589 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Boucher v. Exide Corp., 498 N.E.2d 402, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
The absence of direct case law support for TEC's position is not, in and of itself, fatal to TEC's claim of bad faith. Rather, the Robsons' inclusion of their cause of action and their cause number in their bankruptcy proceedings does not amount to an inference of bad faith as strong as that presented in the above-cited cases. When presented with a weak inference of bad faith, courts should and do pay close attention to the facts surrounding the debtor-plaintiff's scheduling to determine whether the debtor-plaintiff's scheduling amounted to an attempt to play fast and loose with the courts.
Here, the facts surrounding the Robsons' disclosure not only suggest good faith but further indicate that the Robsons actually complied with the bankruptcy 's full disclosure requirement. When asked about the Robsons' full disclosure compliance after being advised of TEC's allegation of bad faith, United States Bankruptcy Trustee Black stated:
In my experience, that [Robsons'] disclosure was consistent with standard bankruptcy practice and it was adequate to put all interested persons on notice of any and all legal claims arising from the present litigated matter. Greater detail or specificity with respect to parties, claims or defenses was unnecessary absent a request for further information.
*
takes the position that the Robsons and their attorneys attempted to conceal the existence of the Robsons' personal injury claims from participants in the Chapter 13 proceedings. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Appellants' App. p. 401 (emphasis added).
Black also offered a benign explanation for the Robsons' wording of their schedule-a schedule that was not requested by the Robsons' creditors. Appellants' App. pp. 381, 401. Black stated, "the actual purpose and effect of those references [to the damage to the Robson's personal property] was to alert interested parties to the damaged condition of the real estate [.]" Id. at 401.
Black has been a Chapter 13 trustee continuously since 1985 and has supervised approximately 10,000 Chapter 13 cases
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