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Robson v. Texas Eastern Corp.8/15/2005
have been affected had the settlement offer been for $3000 or $30,000,000. The Robsons' unsecured debt was roughly $22,000. Black's decision to allow the Robsons to control the litigation at bar was based upon his experienced determination that the time involved in pursuing the Robsons' claims made trustee control of the claims unfeasible; it was not based upon the amount he believed the Robsons would recover. Appellants' App. p. 402.
The Robsons also (1) sent a copy of their complaint-including their personal injury count-to Firstar and (2) sent letters to Firstar and Republic, which specifically notified Firstar and Republic of their personal injury cause of action. Appellants' App. pp. 391-93. The Robsons claim that these two facts are indicative of their good faith.
TEC contends these letters are of no import because they were not sent to the Robsons' Chapter 13 trustee. Br. of Appellee at 11. However, TEC does not demonstrate why the Robsons would re-notify Black of a cause of action that he adamantly insists he already knew about. TEC also asserts that the letters in question did not refer to the Robsons' bankruptcy . Br. of Appellee at 17. However, it can hardly be said that a large creditor would not likely know about one of their debtors' bankruptcy filing. Moreover, TEC fails to demonstrate why Firstar would ask for a copy of the complaint if it were unaware of the Robsons' bankruptcy.
TEC finally notes that the Robsons did not send similar letters discussing their personal injury claim to their unsecured creditors. Id. TEC's assertion misses the import of the letters. The Robsons' letters are not being used to assert that their creditors learned of their personal injury claims as a result of the letters. Rather, the Robsons assert that a party attempting to play fast and loose with the courts generally does not air claims they are attempting to hide from bankruptcy proceedings.
Furthermore, the Robsons' Chapter 13 plan discharged $18,831.28 in unsecured debt. Appellants' App. p. 306. As TEC repeatedly insists that the Robsons believed their claim was worth nearly $3,000,000, it is hard to believe that the Robsons-who were represented-would risk the criminal penalties associated with a fraudulent disclosure or the $3,000,000 judgment itself for unsecured debt over 150 times smaller than their cause of action's purported worth. See 18 U.S.C. ยง 152(1) (debtor concealment of property in bankruptcy proceedings is punishable by a prison sentence of not more than five years).
D. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is particularly problematic in the case at bar because the ultimate issue to be decided is the Robsons' intent to play fast and loose with the courts. See Best Homes v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (issues concerning state of mind are ordinarily improper for summary judgment); see also Murray, 248 B.R. at 488 (bankruptcy judicial estoppel is more troubling in the summary judgment context). Summary judgment is inappropriate even in instances where the facts are not in dispute, if inferences from those facts can be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Rogers v. Grunden, 589 N.E.2d 248, 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied.
The inferences from the undisputed facts of this case do not establish that the Robsons failed to comply with the requirements of federal bankruptcy law. The inferences from the undisputed facts also do not establish that the Robsons had a motive to deceive their creditors. Finally, the rebuttal evidence presented by the Robsons suggests that their actions were not indicative of an attempt to deceive their creditors.
As stated by Black:
Based on m
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