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Mullins v. Parkview Hospital6/30/2005
bility . . . ." Appellants' Br. p. 21.
We first note that the Mullinses cite to no legal authority whatsoever to support this argument, and we point to the well-settled authority that we will not consider an issue on appeal if the appellant has failed to present a cogent argument supported by authority and references to the record. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A); see also Shepherd v. Truex, 819 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Even if we were to consider this argument, we agree with St. Francis that, taken to its logical conclusion, this contention leads to an absurd result: if we were to hold that St. Francis is estopped from denying liability based on the fact that it carried malpractice insurance, any business required to carry liability insurance would be prevented from defending against a negligence lawsuit, regardless of whether there was any negligence. Essentially, a business carrying liability insurance would be strictly liable for negligence, and plaintiffs would no longer have to prove the elements of their claim. Moreover, such a result is prohibited by Indiana Evidence Rule 411: " vidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully." Because the contract between St. Francis and Parkview is the Mullinses' only argument in favor of assigning liability to St. Francis, we conclude that the trial court acted appropriately in awarding summary judgment in favor of St. Francis.
D. Requests for Admission
The Mullinses next argue that the trial court erred in deeming admitted certain requests for admission propounded by St. Francis and VanHoey. Specifically, they contend that their initial denials coupled with explanatory interrogatory responses were sufficient to appropriately deny the requests to admit. St. Francis and VanHoey based their motion for summary judgment on the deemed admissions.
As we consider this argument, we note that we review a trial court's determination on discovery matters for abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 819 N.E.2d 381, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. For a trial court to abuse its discretion, its decision must be clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts of the case. Id. Because of the sensitive nature of discovery matters, the trial court's ruling is cloaked in a strong presumption of correctness on appeal. Id. Thus, we will affirm the ruling if it is sustainable on any legal basis in the record, even though this was not the reason enunciated by the trial court. Id. at 384-85.
VanHoey first argues that the Requests are now irrevocably admitted because the Mullinses failed to file a Trial Rule 36(B) motion to withdraw or amend the admissions. According to Trial Rule 36(B), " ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." We note that we have previously concluded that "'Trial Rule 36(B) does not require a motion for relief under it to be denominated in any particular manner. Merely by challenging deemed admissions and asking for an extension of time to respond, a party satisfies the requirement of T.R. 36(B) that a party move to withdraw or amend deemed admissions.'" Kerkhof v. Kerkhof, 703 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Hanchar Indus. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Wayne Reclamation & Recycling, Inc., 418 N.E.2d 268, 271 n. 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (Staton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Here, the Mullinses did not fail to meet the response deadline so they were not required to seek an extension. And although they did not explicitly call their challeng
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