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Kahlo Jeep Chrysler Dodge of Knightstown10/12/2005
lear and plain meaning. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, we must ascertain the legislature's intent and interpret the statute to effectuate that intent. Id. A statute may be ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable and intelligible interpretation. Id. If interpretation is necessary, the express language of the statute controls and we apply the rules of statutory construction. Id. "We are required to determine, give effect to, and implement the legislative intent underlying the statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship and to favor public convenience." Id.
Section 1 of the Act, labeled "Franchise agreement; unlawful provisions," provides in part:
It is unlawful for any franchise agreement entered into between any franchisor and a franchisee who is either a resident of Indiana or a nonresident who will be operating a franchise in Indiana to contain any of the following provisions:
(3) Allowing substantial modification of the franchise agreement by the franchisor without the consent in writing of the franchisee.
Ind. Code § 23-2-2.7-1. Indiana Code Section 9-23-3-7 specifically applies to new motor vehicle manufacturer-dealer franchise agreements and provides, "It is an unfair practice for a manufacturer or distributor to violate IC 23-2-2.7." Indiana Code Section 9-23-6-9 further provides, "A dealer who is injured by an unfair practice set forth in IC 9-23-3 may sue for relief in a court of competent jurisdiction . . . ." Thus, new motor vehicle dealers fully enjoy the protections of the Act, as well as certain other provisions that apply only to them.
Indiana Code Section 23-2-2.7-4 also provides, "Any franchisee who is a party to a franchise agreement . . . which contains any provision set forth in Section 1 of this chapter or who is injured by an unfair act or practice set forth in Section 2 of this chapter may bring an action to recover damages, or reform the franchise agreement." Finally, Indiana Code Section 23-2-2.7-7 provides, "No action may be brought for a violation of this chapter more than two (2) years after the violation." The Dealers have framed the issue in this case as follows:
The sole issue to be determined in this appeal is when does a cause of action accrue under I.C. § 23-2-2.7-1(3), triggering the two (2) year statute of limitations contained in I.C. § 23-2-2.7-7. Does the statute of limitations begin to run when the franchise agreement is executed, or when a substantial unilateral modification of the franchise agreement is actually attempted?
Appellant's Br. p. 9. DaimlerChrysler does not substantively disagree with this framing of the issue.
We conclude that the statutes at issue here are unambiguous. The essence of the Dealers' argument is that although DaimlerChrysler's standard franchise agreement reserved it the right to unilaterally amend the agreement at anytime, it was impossible to determine whether the modification provision permitted "substantial" modification until such time as DaimlerChrysler actually attempted a "substantial" modification. The Act only prohibits franchise contract provisions that allow the franchisor to make "substantial" unilateral modifications. See I.C. § 23-2-2.7-1(3). Thus, the Dealers contend, its cause of action against DaimlerChrysler did not accrue until such time as it actually attempted a "substantial," as opposed to "insubstantial," modification of the franchise agreement.
We disagree. The franchise agreement, on its face, permitted DaimlerChrysler to make any modification to the agreement that it determined was necessary, provided it did so uniformly to all franchises. It d
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