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Pruitt v. State9/13/2005
rt.
I. Mental Retardation
Pruitt contends that he is mentally retarded and therefore ineligible for the death penalty under both Indiana state law and the Eighth Amendment as explained in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
A. Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof
Since 1994, Indiana has prohibited the execution of the mentally retarded. Ind. Code ยง 35-36-9-6 (2004) (as added by P.L. 158-1994, Sec. 3). Indiana Code sections 35-36-9-1 through 7 provide the procedures through which a trial court is to determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded and therefore not eligible for the death penalty. Indiana Code section 35-36-9-4 places the burden on the defendant to "prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is a mentally retarded individual."
In Atkins, the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of a mentally retarded defendant violates the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Pruitt argues that, in light of the holding that executing a mentally retarded defendant violates the Eighth Amendment, federal due process is violated by the Indiana statutory provision placing on the defendant the burden of proving mental retardation and requiring it to be established under a standard of clear and convincing evidence.
The issue of federal constitutional limits on state burdens of proof and state standards of proof was first addressed in the context of issues other than mental retardation. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) held that it is normally within the power of a state to regulate trial procedure, including burdens of production and persuasion. Id. at 201-02. Patterson upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring a defendant in a murder trial to carry the burden of proving the affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" under New York law, a rough equivalent of Indiana's "sudden heat." Id. at 198. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not proscribe a state rule of criminal procedure unless the procedure "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id. at 202 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Placing the burden on the defendant to prove this defense did not offend any such principle.
In Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), the Supreme Court relied on Patterson in sustaining a state burden of proof rule as to incompetency to stand trial. The Court reaffirmed that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process" Id. at 453, but held that requiring a defendant to prove his incompetence to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence did not offend due process. Medina first examined historical and contemporary practices in determining a defendant's competency to stand trial and found "no historical basis for concluding that the allocation of the burden of proving incompetence to the defendant violates due process." Id. at 448. The Court then went on "to consider whether the rule transgresses any recognized principle of 'fundamental fairness' in operation" and found that it did not. Id. Because placing the burden of showing incompetency neither offended fundamental fairness nor violated traditional practice, it was consistent with the requirements of due process.
The burden of proof is one issue and the standard of required proof is another. In Cooper v.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Indiana Personal Injury Attorneys
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