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Hayes v. Hayes9/9/2005
out the parties' reconciliation and second separation.
Two months before the parties divorced, William attested in a sworn statement that the parties had a "current income tax liability" of $24,000. Some six weeks later, William's attorney indicated during a hearing that William had spent the money remaining in the joint account to satisfy the parties' alleged $65,000 joint tax liability for the years 2001 and 2002. However, it appears that the record contains no probative evidence to show whether a $65,000 tax liability had in fact accrued, or whether any such debt was satisfied out of the $75,000 which Paula left in the joint account.
The court's subsequent division of marital property credited Paula with possessing the $70,000 withdrawn from the joint account at the time of the first separation, but it did not address the fate of the $75,000 which she left in the joint account. Despite the indication by William's attorney during the hearing that the alleged joint tax liability already had been satisfied out of the $75,000 left in the joint account, the court directed William to pay the $65,000 debt "from his part of the marital property." The court then found that although William would receive $376,584.63 in marital property, the satisfaction of a $65,000 tax debt would reduce the net value of his share of the marital property to $311,584.63, which was significantly closer than the original amount to the $217,657.06 in marital property awarded to Paula.
It appears that the trial court erroneously subtracted the value of a previously-satisfied tax liability from William's share of the marital property, resulting in a substantial undervaluing of the marital property actually available to him. In the absence of any probative evidence to show that the $65,000 debt existed at the time of dissolution, we must conclude that the court erred by assigning William liability for the debt, and by subtracting the amount of that debt from the net value of the marital property assigned to William. On remand, therefore, the court's division of marital property should be adjusted accordingly.
Next, Paula contends that the trial court erred by failing to award her a greater share of the parties' marital property. We disagree.
KRS 403.190(1) requires the trial court to divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors including:
(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(b) Value of the property set aside to each spouse;
(c) Duration of the marriage; and
(d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.
As noted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis, a division of marital property need not be equal, but only in "just proportions."
Here, the trial court's judgment includes findings as to the parties' full time employment and their sharing of household chores, as to the duration of their marriage and the value of the property set aside to each, and as to each party's economic circumstances at the time of the dissolution. Further, after specifically considering KRS 403.190 and all relevant factors, the court found that a division of the marital property in "just proportions" required William to pay Paula $30,000 cash in addition to other marital property, resulting in an award to Paula of marital property valued at $217,657.06 (i.e., 43.6
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