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Youngblood v. Lee11/2/2005
etention of an expert. It does not appear disputed, however, that the appellants did not provide the Youngbloods, previous to the morning of the trial, with any documentation prepared by Robertson. Based on those circumstances, the trial court determined that Robertson would not be allowed to testify at the trial. His testimony, as well as the exhibits in connection with his testimony, were proffered by the defense.
Notably, La. C.C.P. art. 1428(1) provides:
A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his [discovery] response with respect to any question directly addressed to the identity and location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, and the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony.
When the Youngbloods filed suit, they also propounded discovery requests against the defendants, one of which inquired as to the name(s) of experts that might be called at trial, as well as "all testing, examinations, evaluations, and the results of said testing, examinations and evaluations. . . ." performed by said expert(s) to be called at trial. Appellants contend now, as they did at trial, that they had disclosed the identity of their expert previously to the Youngbloods, who had every opportunity to depose Robertson. Whereas we do not question the veracity of those assertions, the record does not reflect that fact, because those discovery responses are not part of the record. As stated, it appears undisputed that the appellants did not supply the Youngbloods with copies of the expert documents until the morning of the trial--December 13, 2004.
Our review of the proffered expert documents show that those actually prepared by Robertson (i.e. defense exhibits numbered 3 and 5) and having a substantive nature are dated November 17, 2004--almost a full month prior to the trial of this case. We appreciate that there is no requirement that the rules of law and procedure be relaxed or suspended for pro se litigants. Nor should the rules be applied more quickly or severely to a pro se litigant than to an attorney. However, when dealing with a pro se litigant, it is incumbent upon the members of the bar to well represent their profession and behave with the utmost professionalism so as to avoid any appearance of attempting an unfair advantage over their pro se adversary. Considering the duty to supplement discovery responses imposed under La. C.C.P. art. 1428, which the appellants failed to adhere to without any good reason, combined with the facts that the Youngbloods were proceeding pro se and the appellants were zealous to proceed with the trial, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Robertson to testify.
Moreover, the trial judge has great discretion in the manner in which proceedings are conducted before the trial court, and it is only upon a showing of gross abuse of discretion that appellate courts have intervened. Cooper v. Lacorte, 1999-1726 (La. App. 4th Cir. 05/17/00), 775 So. 2d 4, amended on other grounds, 1999-1726 (La. App. 4th Cir. 01/31/01), 775 So. 2d 704, citing, La. C.C.P. art. 1631 and Harris v. West Carroll Parish School Bd., 605 So. 2d 610 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 609 So. 2d 255 (La. 1992). So considering, and despite the lack of a formal objection by the Youngbloods regarding Robertson's testimony and exhibits, the trial court was within its discretion in deciding to exclude same. In reaching its decision, the trial court noted that it considered it "an unfair thing that [appellants] have done giving the reports to [the Youngbloods] this morning . . . ." Such
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