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School Committee of Norton v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination7/12/2005
Bristol.
March 4, 2005.
Present: Lenk, Kafker, & Katzmann, JJ.
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination. Administrative Law, Substantial evidence, Findings. Handicapped Persons.
Anti-Discrimination Law, Handicap, Damages, Employment, Termination of employment, Attorney's fees. Damages, Emotional distress, Under anti-discrimination law, Back pay, Attorney's fees.
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on March 20, 2003.
A decision of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination was affirmed with the exception of the award of attorney's fees by Richard T. Moses, J., and a motion for judgment on the pleadings was heard by John P. Connor, Jr., J.
The issues presented in this case are whether the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD or commission) correctly determined that Mary-Ann Woodason, a cafeteria worker terminated from her employment by the school committee of Norton (school committee) because of a permanent medical restriction precluding her from lifting in excess of twenty-five pounds, was (1) a qualified handicapped person capable of performing the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation and if so, whether she was (2) entitled to emotional distress damages, lost pension benefits, a back pay award without an offset for unemployment compensation, and attorney's fees. A Superior Court judge affirmed the decision of the MCAD with the exception of the award of attorney's fees, which he concluded were limited as a matter of law to the billing rate the attorney charged at the commencement of the representation, before he joined a large Boston firm. We conclude that the MCAD did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees based on the lodestar method, which calculates the fees using a reasonable market rate, and the judgment shall be so modified. We otherwise affirm the judgment of the Superior Court upholding the MCAD decision.
1. Background
The defendant, Mary-Ann Woodason, began working for the school committee as a cafeteria assistant on March 20, 1989. Woodason had served seven years at the L.G. Nourse Elementary School when, in the spring of 1997, she injured her back and underwent surgery to repair a ruptured disc. On August 19, 1997, she informed the cafeteria director, Irene Stanovich, of the operation and her inability to return to work until she had fully recuperated. They agreed that Woodason would use her accrued sick time until she was ready to return to work. After meeting with her doctor, Woodason called Stanovich on October 22, 1997, to report her progress and informed Stanovich that, due to her condition, she would not be able to lift objects weighing more than twenty-five pounds. Stanovich did not indicate at this time that the restriction would be a problem. On November 19, 1997, Woodason met with her doctor, who cleared her to return to work on December 1, 1997, with a medical restriction prohibiting her from lifting more than twenty-five pounds. Woodason relayed this information to Stanovich on the same day and requested an accommodation. During this conversation, Stanovich told Woodason that she could not return to work with the lifting restriction. Through her counsel's letter dated January 12, 1998, Woodason requested that she be allowed to return to work with an accommodation, which she described as having another employee lift a thirty-one pound milk crate into a milk dispenser, a task that she said was required once a day. On January 28, 1998, the school committee informed Woodason by letter that her employment would be terminated on February 6, 1998 (when her sick leave expired), if she s
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