 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Cheril Young's Case8/31/2005
Workers' Compensation Act, Decision of Industrial Accident Reviewing Board, Expert opinion, Impartial medical examiner, Proximate cause. Appeals Court, Appeal from order of single justice.
The employer, Cape Cod Hospital, appeals from a judgment entered by a single justice of this court affirming a decision of the Department of Industrial Accidents reviewing board awarding worker's compensation benefits to the employee, an emergency room technician, who alleged that she became infected with the hepatitis C virus at work. The only expert medical evidence on the question of causation was the report and deposition of an independent medical examiner (IME) appointed from the roster of impartial physicians pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 11A, as amended by St. 1991, c. 398, § 30. The IME was of the opinion that, even though the employee did not recall receiving a needle stick or laceration involving a sharp object at the hospital, the most likely cause of her infection was an inapparent needle stick sustained on the job . The board twice overturned decisions by the administrative judge rejecting the IME's opinion as speculative.
The single justice concluded that, contrary to the employer's assertion, the board did not find facts that contradicted the facts found by the administrative judge; the board merely ruled, contrary to the administrative judge, that the report and deposition of the IME were not inadequate as matter of law to support a finding of causal connection. The single justice also concluded that the board did not err in ruling that the IME opinion was based on a reasonable medical inference, and, like the board, found Patterson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 48 Mass. App. Ct. 586 (2000), to be distinguishable. The single justice reasoned that, unlike the IME in Patterson, the IME in the present case properly inferred exposure at work from admissible evidence -- that the employee had regular contact with needles and other sharps while performing her job -- and then performed a valid differential diagnosis to rule out other likely causes. We agree with the rationale of the single justice and make the following additional observations.
Our review of the board's decision is a limited one. Pursuant to G. L. c. 152, § 12(2), as amended through St. 1991, c. 398, § 32A, a decision of the board is reviewed in accordance with the standards expressed in the Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A, § 14(7)(a)-(d), (f), and (g). See Scheffler's Case, 419 Mass. 251, 258 & n.4 (1994). Although the employer frames its arguments in terms of these standards, contending that the board exceeded its authority, committed errors of law, and came to a decision that was unwarranted by the facts, we discern no such infirmities.
General Laws c. 152, § 11A(2), provides that an IME's report "shall constitute prima facie evidence of the matters contained therein." Thus, as the board correctly observed, in the absence of contradictory medical evidence, the administrative judge was required to accept the IME report as true. Coggin v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 42 Mass. App. Ct. 584, 589 (1997).
It is true that there are recognized exceptions to this rule. An IME opinion does not attain the status of prima facie evidence if it goes beyond the medical issues in the case, see Scheffler's Case, 419 Mass. at 259; if it is not expressed in terms of probability, see Patterson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 48 Mass. App. Ct. at 592; or if it is unsupported by admissible evidence in the record or any other proper basis, see id. at 597. However, these exceptions do not come into play here.
Whether the employee, as an emergency room worker, was likely to suffer an inapparent needle
Page 1 2 3 Massachusetts Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|