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Galeski v. Wajda12/1/2005
UNPUBLISHED
ON RECONSIDERATION
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Owens, JJ.
Intervenor Stempien appeals by leave granted from an order summarily dismissing her claim for a share of the proceeds from a wrongful death action. We reverse. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
William and Barbara Hall died simultaneously in an automobile accident. Plaintiff filed this wrongful death action on behalf of Barbara Hall's estate. Plaintiff and defendants settled the case and sought court approval of the settlement. Stempien, William's daughter and Barbara's stepdaughter, intervened, claiming a right to a share of the proceeds under MCL 600.2922(3)(b). The trial court ruled that Stempien did not qualify for benefits under the statute and granted plaintiff's motion for summary disposition. This appeal followed.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611, 616; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we also review de novo. Eggleston v Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003).
The persons who may be entitled to damages in a wrongful death action are identified by MCL 600.2922(3), which provides in part:
(a) The deceased's spouse, children, descendants, parents, grandparents, brothers and sisters, and, if none of these persons survive the deceased, then those persons to whom the estate of the deceased would pass under the laws of intestate succession determined as of the date of death of the deceased.
(b) The children of the deceased's spouse.
The trial court declared that Stempien was not a person entitled to damages under MCL 600.2922(3)(b), on the ground that she was not a child of Barbara's spouse because William was presumed to have predeceased Barbara under MCL 700.2104, ยง 2104 of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq. By its own terms, MCL 700.2104 creates a presumption that a person who would otherwise have been an heir predeceased a decedent if the person did not survive the decedent by 120 hours; it applies only to homestead allowance, exempt property, and intestate succession. However, intestate succession only affects those entitled to damages under the last category in MCL 600.2922(3)(a).
(3) Subject to sections 2802 to 2805 of the estates and protected individuals code, 1998 PA 386, MCL 700.2802 to 700.2805, the person or persons who may be entitled to damages under this section shall be limited to any of the following who suffer damages and survive the deceased:
(a) The deceased's spouse, children, descendants, parents, grandparents, brothers and sisters, and, if none of these persons survive the deceased, then those persons to whom the estate of the deceased would pass under the laws of intestate succession determined as of the date of death of the deceased. [Emphasis added.]
Generally, in issues of statutory interpretation, a modifying clause applies only to the last antecedent. Dessart v Burak, 470 Mich 37, 41; 678 NW2d 615 (2004). Therefore, the laws of intestate succession govern those who may recover damages under MCL 600.2922(3)(a), other than the deceased's spouse, children, descendants, parents, grandparents, brothers or sisters who survive the deceased. Thus, MCL 700.2104 clearly does not apply to William, the deceased's spouse. Since it does not apply, there is no presumption that William predeceased Barbara.
Regardless, Stempien's claim is premised on MCL 600.2922(3)(b), which provides in relevant part "the pe
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