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Woodard v. Custer7/12/2005
Chief Justice: Clifford W. Taylor, Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh, Elizabeth A. Weaver, Marilyn Kelly, Maura D. Corrigan, Robert P. Young, Jr., Stephen J. Markman
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
The question presented to this Court is whether expert testimony is necessary in the circumstances of this case. We conclude that it is.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs' fifteen-day-old son was admitted to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) at the University of Michigan Hospital, where he was treated for a respiratory problem. During his stay in the PICU, he was under the care of Dr. Joseph R. Custer, the Director of Pediatric Critical Care Medicine. When the infant was moved to the general hospital ward, physicians in that ward discovered that both of the infant's legs were fractured. Plaintiffs sued Dr. Custer and the hospital, alleging that the fractures were the result of negligent medical procedures, namely, the improper placement of an arterial line in the femoral vein of the infant's right leg and the improper placement of a venous catheter in the infant's left leg.
Defendant physician is board-certified in pediatrics and has certificates of special qualifications in pediatric critical care medicine and neonatal-perinatal medicine. Plaintiffs' proposed expert witness, who signed plaintiffs' affidavit of merit, is board-certified in pediatrics, but does not have any certificates of special qualifications.
Before discovery, the trial court denied defendants' motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs' attorney had a "reasonable belief" under MCL 600.2912d(1) that plaintiffs' proposed expert witness was qualified under MCL 600.2169 to testify against the defendant physician, and, thus, that plaintiffs' affidavit of merit was sufficient. After discovery, the trial court granted defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' expert witness on the basis that he was not actually qualified under MCL 600.2169 to testify against the defendant physician. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claim with prejudice, concluding that plaintiffs could not reach a jury without expert testimony.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs' proposed expert witness was not qualified under MCL 600.2169 to testify against the defendant physician (Judge Borrello dissented on this issue), but reversed the trial court's dismissal on the basis that expert testimony was unnecessary under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., an inference of negligence may be drawn from the fact that the infant was admitted to the PICU with healthy legs and discharged from the PICU with fractured legs (Judge Talbot dissented on this issue).
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 21, 2003 (Docket Nos. 239868-239869). The case was remanded for trial.
Defendants sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals decision that res ipsa loquitur applies and that expert testimony was not necessary. Plaintiffs sought leave to cross-appeal the Court of Appeals decision that their proposed expert witness was not qualified under MCL 600.2169 to testify against the defendant physician. We heard oral argument on whether to grant the applications or take other peremptory action permitted by MCR 7.302(G)(1). 471 Mich 890. We have granted plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal as cross-appellants. In this opinion, we address only defendants' application for leave to appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo decisions on summary disposition motions. Grossman v Brown, 470 Mich 593, 598; 685 NW2d 198 (2004).
III. ANALYSIS
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