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Tull v. WTF8/30/2005
e causes of action covered by subsection 1 -which specifically lists causes of action based on gross negligence, intentional conduct, crimes, product liability, and ordinary negligence-and all other causes of action arising under statutory or common law.
This interpretation harmonizes subsections 1 and 2. Subsection 1(a) sets the parameters where the "basis for the cause of action" arises out of a person's grossly negligent, wanton, willful, or intentional conduct, or a crime; subsection 1(b) sets the parameters where "the cause of action is a product liability action"; and subsection 1(c) sets the parameters where "the cause of action was caused by a person's ordinary negligence." Subsection 2 exempts all other statutory and common law causes of action from these limitations. "The dramshop act is the legislatively-created exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of unlawful sales of intoxicating beverages by licensed retailers, and the cause of action is not based on negligence." Dahn v Sheets, 104 Mich App 584, 593; 305 NW2d 547 (1981). Thus, an action under the dramshop act falls outside the parameters of subsection 1 and is preserved by subsection 2.
In contrast, defendant's interpretation of the statute disregards its plain language and creates discord between subsections 1 and 2. Defendant disregards the word "otherwise" in subsection 2, which delineates negligence, gross negligence, intentional tort, and product liability causes of action, covered by subsection 1, from all other causes of action arising under statutory or common law. Defendant claims that plaintiff's interpretation of subsection 2 "swallows" subsection 1, but, in fact, defendant's interpretation of the statute "swallows" subsection 2 and renders the "otherwise provided by statute or common law" language meaningless, contrary to basic principles of statutory construction. Bageris, supra at162.
MCL 600.2967(2), however, does not define the terms "right" and "remedy," nor does it define "cause of action." "When terms are not expressly defined by statute, a court may consult dictionary definitions. Words should be given their common, generally accepted meaning, if consistent with the legislative aim in enacting the statute." People v Thomas, 263 Mich App 70, 73; 687 NW2d 598 (2004), quoting People v Spann, 250 Mich App 527, 530; 655 NW2d 251 (2002). "If it was the legislative intent that [a term] should have other than the natural meaning, it would have been a simple matter to have so provided." Devillers v Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 473 Mich 562, 570; ___ NW2d ___ (2005), quoting Dahrooge v Rochester German Ins Co, 177 Mich 442, 451; 143 NW 608 (1913).
In the common, generally accepted meaning, a "right" is "a power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person by law," and a "remedy" is "the means of enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong," including "legal or equitable relief." Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edition). A "cause of action is "a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person." Id. Thus, according to the generally accepted meaning, a "right" and a "remedy" do not exist independently of a cause of action because one cannot enforce a right or obtain a remedy without first having a cause of action. Neither the statutory language, nor the generally accepted meaning of the terms "right," "remedy," or "cause of action," support a reading of subsection 2 that would separate the concepts of "right" and "remedy" from "cause of action." Because subsection 2 excludes causes of action not limited by subsection 1, the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff's dramshop action was precluded by the firefighters' statute.
Although this
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