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People v. Binsfeld12/15/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Neff and Davis, JJ.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 750.479a(3), and failing to stop at a personal injury accident, MCL 257.617a(2). Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant's convictions arise from his having left a gas station without having paid for gas, and the resulting motor vehicle chase of defendant by the owner of the gas station and a Michigan State Police trooper. Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the offense of third-degree fleeing and eluding. We disagree.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, this Court "must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Hunter, 466 Mich 1, 6; 643 NW2d 218 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To convict defendant of third-degree fleeing and eluding, the prosecution was required to prove the following six elements: (1) the law enforcement officer involved was in uniform and performing his lawful duties and the officer's vehicle was adequately identified as a law enforcement vehicle, (2) defendant was driving a motor vehicle, (3) the officer, by hand, voice, siren, or emergency lights, ordered defendant to stop, (4) defendant was aware that he was ordered to stop, (5) defendant refused to obey the order by attempting to flee or otherwise avoid being caught by the officer, and (6) a portion of the violation took place in an area where the speed limit was thirty-five miles per hour or less. People v Grayer, 235 Mich App 737, 741; 599 NW2d 527 (1999); see also MCL 750.479a(3). We understand defendant to be challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support only the fourth and fifth of these elements.
Regarding the fourth element, i.e., whether defendant was aware that he was ordered to stop, the state police trooper involved in the chase testified at trial that although he began the chase approximately 300 to 400 yards behind defendant on Hyne Road, he closed the distance between himself and defendant to approximately 100 yards by the time the two entered onto Commerce Road. The trooper further testified that although he could not always see defendant's van because of dips and curves in the road, his lights and siren were on for the entire 10-to 20-mile chase. The trooper described defendant's driving as erratic, testifying that defendant drove well above the speed limit, ran red lights, failed to stop at a stop sign, and forced cars and pedestrians off the road. In addition, the trooper testified that after defendant was apprehended, he stated that he had heard the siren and had seen the lights on the trooper's vehicle and knew that the trooper was behind him on Commerce Road. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that defendant was aware of the trooper's order to stop.
We find this evidence similarly sufficient to support the fifth element of the offense, i.e., that defendant refused to obey the trooper's order to stop by attempting to flee or otherwise avoid being caught by the trooper. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support this element, defendant argues that a rational explanation for his erratic and dangerous driving was that he feared the gas station owner and the consequences of his having struck a car and damaged a lawn prior to the trooper having joined the
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