 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
James v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.11/8/2005
ctually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment. An action resolved on summary disposition is a determination on the merits and can trigger applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel on relitigation. Detroit v Qualls, 434 Mich 340, 357; 454 NW2d 374 (1990).
The doctrine only applies if the same parties or their privies were involved in the prior litigation and in the present litigation. Apcoa, Inc v Dep't of Treasury, 212 Mich App 114, 120; 536 NW2d 785 (1995). "A party is one who is directly interested in the subject matter and has a right to defend or to control the proceedings and to appeal from the judgment. A person is in privy to a party if, after the judgment, the person has an interest in the matter affected by the judgment through one of the parties, such as by inheritance, succession, or purchase." Husted v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 213 Mich App 547, 556; 540 NW2d 743 (1995). Concomitant to the same party requirement is mutuality of estoppel. Mutuality of estoppel also exists if the party seeking to prevent relitigation of an issue was a party, or in privity with a party, in the first action. Monat, supra at 684-685.
Although State Farm was not a named party in the first tort action, mutuality need not be shown and the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable when, State Farm, a defendant in the present declaratory action, and James, a defendant in the first tort action, had a relationship such that the liability of State Farm is entirely dependent on the culpability of James in the first action. See Keywell & Rosenfeld v Bithell, 254 Mich App 300, 347; 657 NW2d 759 (2002). And while defense counsel's loyalty was to James, and the relationship between State Farm and the defense counsel did not rise to the level of an attorney-client relationship, State Farm had the type of relationship with James and the defense counsel that gave it a direct interest in the subject matter such that it is bound by the prior judgment. Atlanta Int'l Ins Co v Bell, 438 Mich 512, 519; 475 NW2d 294 (1991). "' iability insurance policies typically include provisions that both obligate the insurer to provide the insured with a defense and entitle the insurer to control the defense . . . [;] the insurer has both a "duty" and a "right" in regard to the defense of the insured . . . .' It has been appropriately recognized that '[defense counsel] occupies a fiduciary relationship to the insured, as well as to the insurance company . . . .'" Id., quoting Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law, pp 822, 835-836. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to the facts of this declaratory action.
State Farm also argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because State Farm would be prejudiced if denied the opportunity to litigate the issue because it was likely that James' admission was the result of collusion between James, Gasowski, and Sylvestri. However, State Farm has failed to provide any authority in support of its claims of collusion and prejudice. It is insufficient for an appellant to merely announce its position and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for its argument or search for authority to support or reject its position. Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998). Moreover, State Farm offers nothing more than conjecture and speculation of collusion, which is insufficient to create a question of fact for the jury. Cloverleaf Car Co v Phillips Petroleum Co, 213 Mich App 186, 192-193; 540 NW2d 297 (1995).
For the reasons stated we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Jessica R. Cooper, Karen M. Fort Hood, S
Page 1 2 3 4 Michigan Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|