 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Co. v. Titan Insurance Co.10/25/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and White and O'Connell, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. We reverse.
Steven Onore was killed in an automobile accident while he was a passenger in a car driven by Chad Furtick and owned by Larry Furtick. Larry Furtick owned four motor vehicles, three of which, including the 1998 Chevy Camaro involved in the accident, were insured with plaintiff, and one of which was totally unrelated to the accident and insured with defendant. Onore was not the named insured on any no-fault policy, nor did he have a spouse or resident relative with any such insurance.
Onore's survivors claimed benefits from plaintiff, who paid personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, then sought partial recoupment from defendant. When the defendant refused, plaintiff commenced this action. The parties brought cross-motions for summary disposition on the basis of their respective readings of MCL 500.3114(4), which provides in relevant part that a person suffering accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident while an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:
(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied.
(b) The insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied.
Plaintiff acknowledged that it specifically listed the Camaro on its insurance declaration sheet, but nevertheless maintained that defendant was also technically an "insurer of the owner of the vehicle" in question because Larry Furtick insured the unrelated car through defendant. Plaintiff asserted that the plain language of MCL 500.3114(4) made defendant an insurer of equal priority, so the priority statute, MCL 500.3115(2), requires defendant to share the liability for paying PIP benefits. Defendant argued that MCL 500.3114(4)(a) envisions only a single insurer, so only plaintiff was liable as the provider of the policy of insurance on the Camaro. The trial court agreed and granted defendant's motion for summary disposition.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it interpreted MCL 500.3114(4) to mean that only one insurance company could ever be responsible for providing PIP benefits. We agree. We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215 (1999). Likewise, we review de novo a trial court's interpretation of a statute. Id. at 690. "'The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.'" Id., quoting Michigan Basic Property Ins Ass'n v Ware, 230 Mich App 44, 49; 583 NW2d 240 (1998).
Our Supreme Court's handling of a similar situation in Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange [DAIIE] v Home Ins Co, 428 Mich 43, 48; 405 NW2d 85 (1987), and the statutory scheme itself contradicts defendant's proposition that only one insurer is ever liable for PIP benefits under MCL 500.3114(4)(a). In DAIIE, our Supreme Court held that two companies that each insured a different car owned by one man should share liability for paying PIP benefits to the man's widow, even though neither insurance company covered the car that he was driving at the time of his fatal accident. DAIIE, supra. The Court held the companies equally responsible because the statute stated that, "the injured person's insurer shall pay all of the benefits . . . ." MCL 500.3114(1). Despite the statute's plain use of the singular "insurer," the Court rephrased the statute as "Since benefits would be payable b
Page 1 2 3 Michigan Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|