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Wilson v. Lake County Road Commission9/29/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and Markey, JJ.
Defendants appeal from the trial court order denying their motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). We reverse. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff Robert Wilson and his wife, plaintiff Dorothy Wilson, sued defendants for negligent operation of a motor vehicle under the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691,1405, to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1407, as contained in the Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA"), MCL 691.1401 et seq. Robert Wilson alleged that he was physically injured when a snow plow, owned by defendant Lake County Road Commission and driven by defendant Lawrel Trowbridge, an employee of the Commission, threw a plume of snow on him that knocked him down while he was clearing his driveway of snow. Robert Wilson sued for bodily injury and for some injuries that may be considered non-bodily injuries, such as "mental anguish" and "loss of enjoyment of life." Dorothy Wilson was not present at the incident. Her sole claim for loss of consortium was derivative of her husband's claim.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) with regard to plaintiffs' claims for damages based on non-bodily injuries. Defendants argued that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity imposes liability on governmental agencies only for bodily injury and property damage. They contended that Dorothy Wilson's claim for loss of consortium was not a claim for bodily injury and that some of Robert Wilson's claims, such as "loss of enjoyment of life," were not based on bodily injury. The trial court denied defendants' motion, relying on Longworth v Michigan Dep't of Highways and Transportation, 110 Mich App 771; 315 NW2d 135 (1982), for its holding that a claim of loss of consortium was permitted under the highway exception to governmental immunity. MCL 691.1402.
On appeal, defendants argue that the plain language of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity precludes recovery for claims of non-bodily injury, including claims of consortium. We agree.
Resolution of this issue turns on the interpretation of a statute, which presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Eggleston v Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003); Polkton Charter Twp v Pellegrom, 265 Mich App 88, 98; 693 NW2d 170 (2005).
The motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, provides, in part:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner . . .
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 665; 685 NW2d 648 (2004). The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute. Halloran v Bhan, 470 Mich 572, 577; 683 NW2d 129 (2004). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed and judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. Nastal v Henderson & Assoc Investigations, Inc, 471 Mich 712, 720; 691 NW2d 1 (2005); Toth v AutoAlliance International (On Remand), 246 Mich App 732, 737; 635 NW2d 62 (2001).
The specific language of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity is clear in that that governmental agencies are only liable for "bodily injury and property damage." The trial court f
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