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Smith v. Joy9/27/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Meter, P.J., and Murray and Schuette, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition and motion to strike plaintiff's first expert witness. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff suffered a serious laceration as a result of falling off a horse. Defendant Dr. Dennis Joy treated plaintiff in the emergency room. Dr. Joy is board certified in family medicine but works in the emergency room about seventy percent of his professional time. Dr. Joy cleansed plaintiff's wound and sutured the laceration. Dr. Joy did not prescribe any antibiotics for plaintiff. A week later, when plaintiff went to have her sutures removed, she was admitted to the hospital because the wound was infected. Plaintiff had to have the wound surgically reopened and drained and was in the hospital for about a week.
Plaintiff sued defendants, and she now argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition to defendants on the basis that plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Richard Friers, was not able to testify concerning a local standard of care. We agree. We review a motion for summary disposition de novo. Maskery v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 468 Mich 609, 613; 664 NW2d 165 (2003). We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers, 467 Mich 1, 16; 651 NW2d 356 (2002).
MCL 600.2912a addresses the standard of care required for both general practitioners and specialists. MCL 600.2912a(1) states:
Subject to subsection (2), in an action alleging malpractice, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that in light of the state of the art existing at the time of the alleged malpractice:
(a) The defendant, if a general practitioner, failed to provide the plaintiff the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice or care in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community, and that as a proximate result of the defendant failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury.
(b) The defendant, if a specialist, failed to provide the recognized standard of practice or care within that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities reasonably available under the circumstances, and as a proximate result of the defendant failing to provide that standard, the plaintiff suffered an injury.
Both our Supreme Court and this Court have held that the standard of care for a general practitioner is a local standard of care while the standard of care for a specialist is a national standard of care. See e.g., Bahr v Harper-Grace Hosp, 448 Mich 135, 138; 528 NW2d 170 (1995), and Cudnik v William Beaumont Hosp, 207 Mich App 378, 383; 525 NW2d 891 (1994). Recently, in Cox, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the standard of care for nurses. In a footnote, the Court stated:
The statutory standards of care set forth in MCL 600.2912a are often referred to as the "general" or "local" standard of care for general practitioners and the "national" standard of care for specialists. See e.g., Bahr, supra 138. The term "national," however, is not an accurate description of the statutory standard of care for specialists. The plain language of subsection (b) states that the standard of care is that "within that specialty as reasonably applied in light of the facilities available in the community or other facilities reasonably available under the circumstances." MCL 600.2912a . . . . Under the plain language of the statute, then, the standard of care for both general practit
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