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Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hill8/16/2005
UNPUBLISHED
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Cavanagh and Owens, JJ.
Plaintiff brought this declaratory action to determine its duty to defend and indemnify its insured under a homeowner's policy, defendant Hill, in a civil action brought by the Huntingtons for injuries to Steven Huntington ("Huntington") when he was shot by Roderick Gunn during an altercation at the home where Hill and Gunn lived. Hill was convicted of assault and battery for her role in the attack on Huntington. Gunn was convicted of felonious assault and felony firearm. Plaintiff moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the injuries did not arise from an "occurrence" within the meaning of its policy, and that the policy exclusion for intentional or criminal acts applied. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion and granted declaratory judgment in favor of defendant Hill. Plaintiff appeals as of right. We reverse. This case is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision granting or denying summary disposition in a declaratory judgment action. Unisys Corp v Comm'r of Ins, 236 Mich App 686, 689; 601 NW2d 155 (1999). Moreover, the construction and interpretation of the language of an insurance contract is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo. Allstate Ins Co v Muszynski, 253 Mich App 138, 140; 655 NW2d 260 (2002).
Plaintiff argues that Huntington's injuries did not arise from an "occurrence," which is defined in the homeowner's policy as "an accident . . . resulting in bodily injury . . . ."
"Accident" means "an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something out of the usual course of things, unusual, fortuitous, not anticipated, and not naturally to be expected." Allstate Ins Co v McCarn, 466 Mich 277, 281; 645 NW2d 20 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Accidents are evaluated from the standpoint of the insured, not the injured party." Id., p 282. In some instances, an insured's intentional act may constitute an accident, and thus an "occurrence." Id. " f both the act and the consequences were intended by the insured, the act does not constitute an accident. On the other hand, if the act was intended by the insured, but the consequences were not, the act does not constitute an accident, unless the intended act created a direct risk of harm from which the consequences should reasonably have been expected by the insured." Id., pp 282-283. Thus, where an insured pulled the trigger of a gun he mistakenly thought was unloaded, the act was intended, the result was not, and the discharge was an accident. Id., pp 290-291. But an injury does not arise from an "accident" where an insured intends the results of his deliberate acts, but not the magnitude of the results. Id., pp 289-291. Thus, where insureds intentionally set fire to a building, but it spread to another building, the act was not an accident. Id., p 290; Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Masters, 460 Mich 105, 116; 595 NW2d 832 (1999). Similarly, where an insured engaged in a fight intentionally tripped his opponent, the insured reasonably should have expected injury and the fact that the injury was not the specific harm intended is irrelevant; the injury did not result from an accident. McCarn, supra, p 289; Nabozny v Burkhardt, 461 Mich 471; 606 NW2d 639 (2000).
In light of Hill's conviction for assault and battery, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Hill intended to injure or put Huntington in fear or apprehension of an immediate battery. See People v. Datema, 448 Mich 585, 602; 533 NW2d 272 (1995); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Fisher, 192 Mich App 371, 376; 481 N
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