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Rowe v. Munye8/18/2005
g disability or medical condition from those caused by the accident" and is not intended to shift the burden to the defendant in every case. But, when confusing or conflicting testimony, jury indecision, or juror disagreement could lead to the jury's inability to separate damages, we believe, rather than placing all uncertainty on the defendant, the better option is for the jury to make a rough apportionment so that the plaintiff receives fair compensation for her injuries. See Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 363 (Haw. 1994) (concluding that the jury should be instructed to roughly apportion between injuries a plaintiff received in separate accidents). We agree with the court of appeals that "it would be the exceptional case in which there is no reasonable basis for apportionment." Rowe, 674 N.W.2d at 768; see also Dobbs, supra, ยง 174 at 425 (noting that surprising bases for apportionment can be found).
To sum up our analysis, we conclude that CIVJIG 91.40 creates confusion for the jury and blurs the distinctions among a plaintiff with an aggravation of a pre-existing injury , a plaintiff injured by joint and several tortfeasors, and the eggshell plaintiff doctrine. Adoption of CIVJIG 91.40 would change our case law and would shift the burden of proving apportionment to the defendant in cases involving a single defendant and aggravation of a pre-existing injury. We choose not to do so. The defendant should be responsible only for the injuries that are legally caused by the defendant's negligence. CIVJIG 91.40 goes too far by making the defendant responsible for injuries that he did not cause. We therefore hold that the district court erred in giving CIVJIG 91.40 to the jury and that CIVJIG 91.40, as presently written, misstates Minnesota law on the defendant's burden of proof in a case involving one defendant and aggravation of the plaintiff's pre-existing injury or condition.
II.
Our conclusion that the district court erroneously gave the jury an instruction that misstates the law does not end our analysis in this case. A complainant will not receive a new trial for errors in jury instructions unless the error was prejudicial. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 389 N.W.2d 876, 885 (Minn. 1986). Therefore, we must determine whether Munye was prejudiced by the giving of this instruction. In determining whether erroneous instructions resulted in prejudice, we must construe the instructions as a whole from the standpoint of the total impact on the jury. Kroning v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1997). We will, however, give the complainant the benefit of the doubt by granting the complainant a new trial if the effect of the erroneous instruction cannot be determined. See Morlock, 650 N.W.2d at 159.
Rowe argues that, if the district court erred in giving CIVJIG 91.40, the error was not prejudicial to Munye because (1) the jury's finding of permanent injury to Rowe refutes the defendant's argument that Rowe suffered no permanent injury; and (2) the jury did not have to rely on the last sentence of CIVJIG 91.40 because it "clearly apportioned the damages." Rowe contends that, because the jury awarded her only a portion of the damage award she requested, the jury did "in fact separate the pre-existing from the aggravation injuries" and Munye suffered no prejudice.
Munye argues that CIVJIG 91.40 caused him substantial prejudice because this instruction misstated his burden of proof. He contends that any argument that the jury may have apportioned the damages between the new damages and those that existed before the accident "is purely speculative." As a result, he asserts that because the total impact of CIVJIG 91.40 on the ju
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