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State v. Urrabazo12/13/2005
t in the second degree was also dismissed as part of the plea agreement. The district court denied appellant's request for a downward departure and sentenced appellant to 144 months in prison and imposed a 5-year conditional-release period. Appellant now appeals, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.
DECISION
Appellant argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because the plea lacked an adequate factual basis. While appellant challenges the factual basis and procedure for his August 4, 2004 guilty plea, this argument was not raised with the district court. A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing by filing "a timely motion and proof to the satisfaction of the court that withdrawal [of the plea] is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Appellant did not file any post-sentencing motions with the district court. Generally, this court will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). A review of the record, however, shows that appellant's guilty plea was supported by an adequate factual basis. Appellant argues that the statute under which he was charged requires sexual penetration, personal injury , and the use of force or coercion. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2002). Appellant acknowledges that there was sexual penetration, and that under Minnesota law, pregnancy is considered a personal injury under the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 8 (2002). Appellant argues, however, that the state failed to provide a factual basis for the element of use of force or coercion. While appellant refused to admit that he forced L.R. to have sex with him, the record contains an adequate factual basis to support the coercion element of the statute. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 14 (2002) defines "coercion" as ords or circumstances that cause the complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will inflict bodily harm upon, or hold in confinement, the complainant or another, or force the complainant to submit to sexual penetration or contact, but proof of coercion does not require proof of a specific act or threat.
The requirement of coercion is satisfied when an actor causes "a complainant . . . fear while accomplishing sexual contact." State v. Middleton, 386 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Minn. 1986). Here, appellant locked the door, L.R. attempted to resist appellant's advances, and, on one occasion, appellant overcame L.R.'s resistance using physical force. Because these circumstances amount to coercion, appellant's argument fails.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred by failing to follow the proper procedures for an Alford plea. Again, this issue was not raised in the district court and, therefore, will not be addressed on appeal. Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357. We note, however, that the record shows that appellant did not enter an Alford plea but rather, pleaded straight up to the first-degree criminal -sexual-conduct charge. Therefore, this argument is also without merit.
Affirmed.
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