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In re Estate of Kotowski10/11/2005
ail. In two affidavits, Becker denies actual receipt of the notice to creditors. On review of summary judgment, we are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case Becker. Neither the estate nor Becker contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Becker received the notice. Thus, assuming that Becker did not receive the notice to creditors despite its deposit in the mail, service of the notice was ineffective. As such, Becker timely presented her claim within one year after the decedent's death. See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-803(a). Summary judgment, therefore, is not justified on this basis.
The estate counters that, because Becker was participating in proceedings against the estate prior to April 16, she had actual notice of the notice to creditors. Knowledge of an estate, or of a proceeding in probate, does not supply notice to creditors under the UPC. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 130 F.R.D. 449, 453 (D. Colo. 1990); Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 606 N.W.2d at 756. Nor will participation in a proceeding necessarily establish this notice as a matter of law. See Schwartz v. First Tr. Co. of St. Paul, 236 Minn. 165, 171, 52 N.W.2d 290, 295 (1952) (holding that when heirs to estate participated in receivership proceeding, delivery of district court order by mail did not by itself establish actual notice). The estate essentially proposes a form of inquiry notice for some creditors who are entitled to more than notice by publication under section 524.3-803(a)(1). We reject such a rule because it would undermine the certainty and efficiency of notice under the UPC. See Minn. Stat. § 524.3-801 (2004). Based on the foregoing reasoning, Becker's claim for personal services arising before the death of Kotowski was not time-barred.
II.
Becker next challenges the conclusion of the district court that she did not timely file a petition contesting the notice of disallowance. Because the notice of disallowance did not warn of the time frame in which she could contest the disallowance, Becker argues that the notice is defective and that she may proceed with an untimely petition for allowance of a disallowed claim.
Section 524.3-806 governs disallowance of a claim and provides in relevant part:
he personal representative may mail a notice to any claimant stating that the claim has been disallowed. . . . Every claim which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal representative is barred so far as not allowed unless the claimant files a petition for allowance in the court or commences a proceeding against the personal representative not later than two months after the mailing of disallowance or partial allowance if the notice warns the claimant of the impending bar. Failure of the personal representative to mail notice to a claimant of action on the claim . . . has the effect of a notice of allowance . . . .
Minn. Stat. § 524.3-806(a) (2004). When a notice of disallowance is untimely, or when it fails to clearly and unequivocally indicate disallowance, the notice is ineffective and the claim against the estate is allowed. Peterson v. Marston, 362 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Minn. 1985); Law Office of William F. Bratain II v. Anderson (In re Estate of Evans), 901 P.2d 1138, 1141-42 (Alaska 1995).
Few reported cases have considered the effect of failing to disclose the "impending bar" for a petition contesting a disallowed claim. In Wishbone, Inc. v. Eppinger, the Colorado Court of Appeals construed language identical with Minn. Stat. § 524.3-806(a) and stated:
he mandatory warning invokes the 60-day time bar only, and failure to give such notice affects only that time bar. Si
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