 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
In re Estate of Kotowski10/11/2005
nce it cannot be said here that the failure to warn of the 60-day time bar defeated the substance or intended effect of the notice of disallowance, failure of [the estate] to comply strictly with this notice requirement only relieves [claimants] of the requirement to file their claim seeking allowance within 60 days.
829 P.2d 434, 437 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Hall v. Hartley (In re Estate of Hall), 948 P.2d 539 (Colo. 1997). Considering a provision adapted from UPC § 3-806, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Telesetsky v. Wight and held:
The fact that the administrators gave a defective notice of disallowance does not necessarily lead to the result . . . [that the] claim is automatically allowed. A procedural misstep which has caused no prejudice to the [claimant] should not be the basis of automatic allowance of the . . . claim without regard to its merit. It suffices to put the [claimant] in the same position [the claimant] would have been in had the administrators given the required notice[.]
482 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Mass. 1985) (citations omitted).
Here, the parties do not contest that the October 16 letter supplies clear and unequivocal notice that the claim was disallowed. The only defect in the notice is the failure to "warn[ ] the claimant of the impending bar." Because Becker was not informed of the time period in which she could file a petition contesting the disallowance, the proper remedy as a matter of law is to exempt Becker from this time period and to permit her to proceed on the late petition. See Telesetsky, 482 N.E.2d at 823; Wishbone, Inc., 829 P.2d at 437. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's summary judgment in favor of the estate on the claim for personal services to Kotowski and remand for consideration of the claim on the merits.
III.
Becker next disputes the determination of the district court that her claim for attorney fees was untimely. Because she incurred attorney fees in her successful petition to remove Fuller as personal representative, Becker characterizes her claim as an "expense of administration" that may be presented any time prior to the closing of the estate.
When a claim arises after the death of the decedent, Minn. Stat. § 524.3-803 (2004) governs the period for presentation of the claim. Section 524.3-803 provides in relevant part:
(b) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent . . . are barred against the estate . . . unless presented . . . .
(2) . . . within four months after it arises.
(c) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: . . .
(4) the presentment and payment at any time before [formal termination of the administration of the estate] of:
(i) any claim arising after the death of the decedent that is referred to in section 524.3-715, clause (18), although the same may be otherwise barred hereunder[.]
Minn. Stat. § 524.3-803. The exception to the four-month time frame for claims arising at or after the decedent's death referred to in section 524.3-803(c)(4)(i) provides:
personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons, may properly: . . .
(18) pay . . . without the presentation of a claim, the reasonable and necessary last illness expenses of the decedent[,] . . . reasonable funeral expenses, debts and taxes with preference under federal or state law, and other taxes, assessments, compensation of the personal representative and the personal representative's attorney, and all other costs and exp
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Minnesota Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|