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George v. Estate of Baker12/6/2005
dict will be overturned only if no reasonable mind could find as did the jury." Id. If the answers to special verdict questions can be reconciled on any theory, the verdict will not be disturbed. Id. (emphasis in original). The issue of causation is for the jury to decide, and its decision will stand unless manifestly contrary to the evidence viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id.
Initially, appellant argues that respondent-Baker failed to meet his burden of proof establishing excuse or justification. Essentially, appellant argues that, because Baker crossed over the median, he was negligent. Clearly, proof of a violation of the traffic code establishes a prima facie case of negligence. Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 76 N.W.2d 660, 666-67 (1956). A defendant bears the burden of establishing excuse or justification for a violation and, " n the absence of excuse or justification, liability follows as a matter of law if, upon proof of violation, the negligence is the proximate cause of the injury ." Id. at 195-96, 76 N.W.2d at 667. But the issue of excuse or justification was resolved by the jury in appellant's favor when it concluded that respondent-Baker was negligent.
Appellant further argues that a mistake in the curative jury instruction on the standard of care skewed the jury's deliberations and consideration of the causation question. Appellant contends that if the jury applied the highest degree of care rather than the reasonable person standard expressed in the curative instruction, then negligence and causation would be more easily established. But negligence and proximate cause are separate issues for the jury to decide in assigning liability. Vanderweyst v. Langford, 303 Minn. 575, 228 N.W.2d 271, 272 (1975). And the district court properly instructed the jury on causation, i.e., that a direct cause "is a cause that has a substantial part in bringing about the accident." Appellant has not challenged the instruction to the jury on causation. On this record, we cannot conclude that the curative instruction changed the outcome of the case.
The crux of appellant's argument is that the jury cannot find respondent-Baker negligent and then find that the negligence was not the direct cause of the accident. But, " t is a well-settled principle that causation, like negligence itself, is a fact issue for the jury except when the facts are undisputed and are reasonably susceptible of but one inference." Jorgensen v. Hawton, 281 Minn. 370, 375, 161 N.W.2d 676, 680 (1968) (citation and alterations omitted). A finding of negligence without a finding of direct cause is not perverse where there is any evidence tending to support the jury's verdict. See, e.g., Lott v. Davidson, 261 Minn. 130, 136-37, 109 N.W.2d 336, 341 (1961); Simon v. Carroll, 241 Minn. 211, 217, 62 N.W.2d 822, 827 (1954).
Here, the jury's verdict regarding causation is not contrary to the evidence "viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the verdict." Hauenstein, 347 N.W.2d at 275. The jury could have determined that appellant did not meet his burden of establishing causation because the evidence regarding Baker's speed was inconclusive. Also, the jury could reasonably have found that, even if Baker failed to act with the utmost degree of care under the common carrier standard, the direct cause of the accident was unavoidable, and due to the sudden onset of inclement weather. See, e.g., Pouliot v. Fitzsimmons, 582 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Minn. 1998) (holding that jury could reasonably infer that evidence of deteriorating weather and road conditions excused negligence). The inference that weather was the direct or proximate cause of the accident was sufficiently supported b
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