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Spiece v. Garland11/15/2005
Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Hardwick, P.J., Breckenridge and Spinden, JJ., concur.
Opinion:
Melody Garland appeals from the circuit court's order granting a new trial based on juror misconduct. We reverse and remand.
Procedural History
A jury awarded Mark Spiece $75,000 for injuries he sustained in a vehicular accident with Melody Garland. After judgment was entered, Spiece filed a Motion for New Trial alleging that one of the jurors had failed to truthfully respond to voir dire questions regarding her involvement in prior lawsuits. On June 28, 2004, the circuit court entered an "Order" granting the motion for new trial, without stating any reason for its decision.
Two days later, Garland appealed the order granting a new trial. On July 2, 2004, the circuit court entered a "Judgment/Order" explaining that the new trial motion was granted based on the "misconduct of Juror 3, Martha Teodori, who failed to disclose prior civil litigation after the question was specifically asked during voir dire."
Point on Appeal
The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in granting the motion for new trial. Garland contends the order must be reversed because Spiece has not met his burden of showing non-discretionary grounds for the new trial, as required by Rule 84.05(c)-(d). Garland further argues there was no good cause for a new trial because the record does not support a finding that Juror No. 3 engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose information requested during voir dire. Garland seeks reinstatement of the jury verdict and the judgment awarding Spiece $75,000 in damages.
The applicable standard of review depends upon whether this appeal properly arises from the "Order" granting the new trial or the "Judgment" explaining the reasons for the new trial. Garland contends Section 512.020, grants express authority to appeal "any order granting a new trial." If the order is appealable in this case, Rule 84.05(c) creates a presumption that the motion for new trial was erroneously granted because the circuit court failed to specify grounds for its decision. Garland, therefore, argues Spiece must overcome the presumption on appeal, by affirmatively demonstrating an adequate, non-discretionary ground for a new trial. Bishop v. Carper, 81 S.W.3d 616, 619 (Mo.App. 2002); Rule 84.05(c) and (d).
Spiece argues that the original order could not be appealed because it was not denominated as a judgment or decree, as required by Rule 74.01 and discussed in Brooks v. Brooks, 98 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Mo. banc 2003) (although a special order may be appealable by statute, "to perfect the appeal, it is still necessary to denominate the order as a 'judgment or decree'"). Spiece contends the grant of a new trial was not appealable until the circuit court entered the "Judgment/Order" explaining the reasons for its decision. Given the court's explanation of grounds, Spiece argues the decision to grant a new trial cannot be reversed on appeal unless the circuit court clearly abused its discretion. See Lowdermilk v. Vescovo Bldg. & Realty Co., 91 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Mo.App. 2002).
We agree with Garland that the original order granting the new trial was appealable under the express language of Section 512.020. The Brooks rationale (requiring the denomination of a "judgment") applies only to "special orders [entered] after final judgment" and, in light of contrary authority, should not be extended to orders granting new trials. In Duckett v. Troester, 996 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Mo.App. 1999), we held the grant of a new trial is appealable, whether or not it is denominated as a judgment. G
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