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Custer v. Hartford Insurance Co.8/23/2005
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I start with the observation that the claimant's injuries bore a circumstantial or positional relationship to his employment. The claimant, a few minutes before the accident, had been engaged in work for his employer; and, were it not for his work, he presumably would have been somewhere else at the time of the accident. Because of the positional relationship of the injury to his employment, and because of natural sympathy as to his injuries, there is a huge temptation to construe the Workers' Compensation Act in such a way as to award compensation for these injuries. What is troubling, however, is the question of whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, we can reasonably rule that this injury arose "in the course of" his employment, within the meaning of section 287.020.3.
Inherent in this inquiry is the question of how we are to approach this case. If we are, as section 287.800 says, to construe the terms of the statute liberally, "with a view to the public welfare," are we to apply the law with a built-in bias in favor of the claimant in our proceedings under the act? I pause to consider this question before proceeding further with the analysis.
The workers' compensation law is "entirely a creature of statute." Greenlee v. Dukes Plastering Servs., 75 S.W.3d 273, 276 (Mo. banc 2002). Therefore, our judicial decisions must start and end with the statutory language. We must yield to legislative policy as expressed in the language employed by the General Assembly.
Sections 1.010 and 1.090 are provided by the General Assembly to guide us in the interpretation of its enactments.
... o act of the general assembly or law of this state shall be held to be invalid, or limited in its scope or effect by the courts of this state, for the reason that it is in derogation of the common law, or with such statutes or acts of parliament [of England]; but all acts of the general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof.
Section 1.010, RSMo 2000. Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import.
Section 1.090, RSMo 2000.
Also, as already mentioned, the Workers' Compensation Act itself includes a provision relating to judicial interpretation and application of the Act:
All of the provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare and a substantial compliance therewith shall be sufficient to give effect to rules, regulations, requirements, awards, orders or decisions of the division and the commission, and they shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void for any omission of a technical nature in respect thereto.
Section 287.800, RSMo 2000.
In 1925, after two prior workers' compensation enactments had been defeated by public referendum, a compensation law that was supported by both labor and business groups was enacted with broad public approval. R. R OBERT C OHN, H ISTORY OF W ORKMEN ' S C OMPENSATION L AW, reprinted in 15 V.A.M.S. 17-52 (1965), at 22-24. The act codified the common law principle that the employer had a responsibility to provide a reasonably safe place to work and a reasonably safe method of work. See Kelso v. W. A. Ross Const. Co ., 85 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. 1935); See also COHN at 24-25. It replaced that part of the common law that required that the employee prove the employer's negligence, and it abrogated the traditional common law defenses, such as contributory negligence. Id . at 22-24. The
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