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Custer v. Hartford Insurance Co.8/23/2005
welfare, as the statute calls for, nor liberal construction of statutory terms favoring the claimant (which may often as a practical matter be the same thing), "authorize extending the terms of the act beyond what they plainly say." Haid, 61 S.W.2d at 954. The act is to be construed so as to give effect to the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the words "if possible." Greenlee v. Dukes Plastering Serv., 75 S.W.3d 273, 276 (Mo. banc 2002).
In light of the foregoing, one can see that we are to give a liberal construction to the scope of the act, with a view to the public welfare, so as not to exclude any class of workers that the legislature would not have intended to exclude. Section 287.800. We are also to favor a broader rather than a narrower interpretation of the terms of the act. Id . This will result in injuries and occupational diseases being deemed compensable as they are reasonably determined to fit within the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory terms, including definitions. We are to give effect to the plain words in their ordinary meaning as much as possible. Greenlee, 75 S.W.3d at 276; Pierson v. Treasurer of Mo., 126 S.W.3d 386, 390 (Mo. banc 2004); section 1.090. In reviewing a record, we are to view the evidence and the factual findings objectively, determining whether the ruling of the Commission is supported by competent and substantial evidence in the context of the whole record. See Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d at 223.
Our task of analysis here is also affected by the 1993 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act. In that year, the Missouri General Assembly, apparently not content with some existing approaches of the Commission and the courts, adopted statutory changes which seemed, on their face, designed to limit, rather than expand, compensability in certain cases. Prior to the 1993 amendments, section 287.020.2 only served to define the word "accident." The 1993 revision added the following sentences to that subsection:
An injury is compensable if it is clearly work related. An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
Section 287.020.2. This language was not previously a part of the act.
With this amendment, the General Assembly indicated it wanted to exclude from compensation those injuries or conditions where the injury was not substantially related to the employment but was only "triggered" or "precipitated" by the employment. Section 287.020.2. That amendment only serves, in my view, to make clearer in this case what would otherwise have been already clear about whether the claimant here was in the course of his employment.
When the only relationship between the work and the injury is that the injury occurred in a traffic accident while the employee was traveling home from a different worksite than usual, it would seem to be an instance of the work merely "precipitating," or merely "providing an occasion" for the injury. See Bear v. Anson Implement, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Mo. App. 1998).
The majority in this case prefers to engage in discussion of the "coming and going rule" and its judicially crafted exceptions. While this practice may often be useful, it can also, unfortunately, cause failure to consider whether the worker was "in the course of employment" as that phrase is ordinarily understood. See, e.g., Brown v. Mid-Central Fish Company, 641 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. App. 1982), which is discussed in the majority opinion.
Mr. Custer frequently traveled (or "extensively traveled," in t
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