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Welch v. Contreras10/25/2005
y owned property is a separate and distinct action from the separate action each has a right to maintain for his or her own personal injuries." Id. at 313.
If we apply the test that is used to determine whether a cause of action is single and cannot be split, the result in Lee makes sense. That test is (i) "whether the separate actions brought arise out of the same act, contract, or transaction"; or (ii) "whether the parties, subject matter, and evidence necessary to sustain the claim are the same in both actions." Nicholson Constr. Co. v. Mo. Hwy. & Transp. Comm'n , 112 S.W.3d 6, 10 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003). Clearly, the evidence necessary to sustain claims for property damage and personal injury are different, and joint chattel owners have interests that differ from individuals with personal injuries.
In our case, one plaintiff has sued multiple parties, including PMC, in Kansas. In Missouri, the same plaintiff has sued PMC and an employee omitted from her action in Kansas. The transaction is the same, the subject matter is the same, the legal theories are virtually the same, and the evidence needed to sustain the claims is exactly the same. PMC was sued in both actions under respondeat superior for the conduct of its employees, including Mr. Contreras. And while Ms. Welch has the right to file a lawsuit against Mr. Contreras in Missouri, she clearly cannot bring the same lawsuit twice against PMC. See Bagsby v. Gehres , 139 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) (court finds cause of action split even where previously filed suit involved eleven defendants and case at bar involved only one of the eleven); McCrary v. Truman Med. Ctr. , 943 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) (strict liability claims against hospital for surgery and implant dismissed as improper splitting of cause of action where previous suit alleged medical malpractice against hospital and dentist for same surgical procedure). As noted by the court in Hutnick v. Beil , 84 S.W.3d 463, 465 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002), there are "sound policy reasons for prohibiting a party from splitting a cause of action." Among those reasons is the protection of defendants from the harassment of a multiplicity of lawsuits on the same cause of action or claims. Grue v. Hensley, 210 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Mo. 1948).
Ms. Welch split her cause of action as to PMC. Thus, PMC was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Chaney , 954 S.W.2d at 515. As for Mr. Contreras, Ms. Welch may proceed with the lawsuit against him. We reverse in part, affirm in part and remand for further proceedings.
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