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Jones v. St. Charles County11/8/2005
Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED IN PART; AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Hoff, P.J., and Cohen, J., concur.
Opinion:
Steve Jones, Robert Jones, Therese Signaigo, Marycarol Jones, Jennifer Jones, and Steve Jones as personal representative of the Estate of Catherine Jones (collectively referred to herein as "plaintiffs"), appeal the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of St. Charles County ("the county"). Plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact exist concerning the county's liability under the Missouri Stock Law and its waiver of sovereign immunity. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
Catherine Jones ("decedent") was driving a vehicle on highway 40 when she struck a horse. Jones died from injuries at the scene of the accident. The horse was owned by Rafter Heart, Inc. ("RHI"), and had been placed in a nearby pasture located on property owned by the county. Pursuant to a concession agreement with the county, RHI operated stables and a riding concession on the property. Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against RHI and St. Charles County. In count one of the petition, plaintiffs alleged liability pursuant to the Missouri Stock Law, section 270.010 RSMo (2000) . In count two, plaintiffs alleged general negligence. The county moved to dismiss the action, and alternatively moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no joint venture between the county and RHI, and plaintiffs failed to plead the essential elements to invoke the Missouri Stock Law against the county. The court also found that the county did not waive its sovereign immunity. The court found no just reason for delay existed, finalizing the judgment for purposes of appeal . Plaintiffs now appeal.
We review the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo . Missouri Employers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nichols , 149 S.W.3d 617, 622-23 (Mo. App. 2004); (citing ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. , 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993)). We do not defer to the trial court. Id . at 623. Whether the decision of the court is proper is purely an issue of law. Id . We will uphold the grant of summary judgment on appeal if no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id . We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was entered, and we afford them the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id . The movant's right to judgment differs depending upon whether the movant is a "'defending party.'" Id . A "defending party" may be entitled to summary judgment where it can show facts to negate any element of the plaintiff's claim. Skay v. St. Louis Parking Co. , 130 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Mo. App. 2004). "'Where the facts underlying this right to judgment are beyond dispute, summary judgment is proper.'" Id.; (quoting ITT Commercial, 854 S.W.2d at 381).
In their first point, plaintiffs claim the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the county on count one because it was a possessor of the horse that escaped and collided with Jones's vehicle. Plaintiffs argue that while the county did not own the horse, it owned the land upon which the horse was kept, and therefore, could be considered a possessor of the horse for purposes of the Missouri Stock Law.
Pursuant to section 270.010, it is unlawful to allow horses to run at large outside an enclosure, and the owner of the animal is responsible for damages sustained by persons as a result of the animal running at l
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