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State v. Beck7/26/2005
ords, that if Instruction No. 11 had contained the unlawful-force language, rather than the imminent-danger-of-harm language, the jury would have found that the appellant was acting in lawful self-defense in stabbing the victim.
In convicting the appellant, the jury necessarily rejected his claim of self-defense. However, we do not know on what basis. Regardless, it does not appear that the failure of Instruction No. 11 to use the unlawful-force language of section 563.031 had any bearing on the rejection of the appellant's claim of self-defense. The victim testified that the appellant was the initial aggressor, while the appellant testified that the victim was the initial aggressor. If the jury believed the victim's testimony in that regard, that alone would have been a sufficient basis for rejecting the appellant's claim of self-defense. And, if that were the case, then it mattered not in the jury's rejection of the appellant's claim of self-defense whether Instruction No. 11 employed the unlawful-force language of section 563.031, rather than the imminent-danger-of-harm language of MAI-CR 3d 306.06.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the jury believed the appellant's testimony that the victim was the initial aggressor, it still could have rejected the appellant's self-defense claim on the basis that he did not have a reasonable belief that his stabbing the victim six times with a knife was necessary to defend against the victim's grabbing him from behind. In other words, even if the jury believed that the victim was the initial aggressor, the decisive issue, in determining whether the appellant acted in lawful self-defense, did not revolve around whether he had a reasonable belief as to the victim's use of "unlawful force," but whether he had a reasonable belief that his acts of stabbing the victim were necessary to defend himself against the victim. And, once again, if that were the case, then it mattered not to the jury's rejection of the appellant's claim of self-defense whether Instruction No. 11 employed the unlawful-force language of section 563.031, rather than the imminentdangerofharm language of MAI-CR 3d 306.06 .
Because we find that the failure of Instruction No. 11 to instruct the jury on the appellant's defending against the "use or imminent use of unlawful force" by the victim, as required by section 563.031,rather than defending against an "imminent danger of harm from the acts of the victim," as required by MAI-CR 3d 306.06,did not have any bearing on the jury's denying the appellant's claim of self-defense, we deny plain error relief on that basis. And, having done so, we now move to the plain error specifically raised by the appellant as to Instruction No. 11.
The appellant claims in this point that the trial court should have modified, sua sponte, Instruction No. 11, by adding language to the paragraph of part B of MAI-CR 3d 306.06 so that the jury would have been instructed that it could find that he acted in "lawful self-defense" in stabbing the victim, if it found that the defendant "reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of harm from the acts of Matthew Snarr and those whom the defendant reasonably believed were acting in concert with Matthew Snarr and the defendant used only such force as reasonably appeared to be necessary to defend himself[.]" In response, the State argues:
But the plain language of the pattern instruction refutes [the appellant's] argument. The instruction allows the jury to consider whether a defendant 'reasonably believe he is in imminent danger of harm from the other person.' MAI-Cr3d 306.06, Part A . 'Reasonable belief,' in turn, is defined as a 'belief based on reasonable grounds, that is, grounds
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