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n Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). This Court has adopted this preference for arbitration. See Smith Barney, Inc. v. Henry, 775 So.2d 722 (Miss. 2001); I.P. Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss Corp., 726 So.2d 96, 103-04 (Miss. 1998); Hutto v. Jordan, 204 Miss. 30, 36 So.2d 809, 812 (1948).
East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So.2d at 713.
. United States Supreme Court precedent clearly evidences this preference for arbitration provisions and expressly recognizes that only generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, can be used to invalidate arbitration provisions or agreements contemplated under section 2 of the FAA. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 134 L.Ed. 2d 902 (1996). See Allied-Bruce, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281, 115 S.Ct. 834, 843 130 L.Ed. 2d 753 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1921-1922, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989); Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987). In this way, the Supreme Court does not allow state courts to single out arbitration provisions for suspect status and "invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions." Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687, 116 S.Ct. at 1656. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281, 115 S.Ct. at 843; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9, 107 S.Ct. 2520, 2527, n.9, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987)).
. In Perry, the U.S. Supreme Court provided clear meaning to the Federal Arbitration Act and stated:
Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements." Id., at 16, 104 S.Ct. 861 (footnote omitted). Section 2, therefore, embodies a clear federal policy of requiring arbitration unless the agreement to arbitrate is not part of a contract evidencing interstate commerce or is revocable "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. "We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under state law."Keating, supra, at 11, 104 S.Ct., 858.
Perry, 482 U.S. at 489-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2525.
I. WHETHER THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IS PART OF A CONTRACT EVIDENCING INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
. A threshold determination which must be considered is whether the parties' admission agreement falls within the provisions of § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The FAA requires "that 'we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.'" East Ford, 826 So.2d at 713 (citing Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2337, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987)). Specifically, § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, relates to the enforceability of arbitration provisions and provides that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable and
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