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Jackson v. Hodge9/13/2005
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/13/2005
BEFORE BRIDGES, P.J., MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ.
. On April 26, 2002, Nathaniel and Cynthia Jackson filed a complaint in the Jackson County Circuit Court. In their complaint, the Jacksons alleged that on April 28, 1999, Amelia Hodge negligently ran a stop sign and collided with the Jacksons, who suffered damages as a result. Hodge filed her answer on August 28, 2002, and followed with a motion for summary judgment on July 17, 2003. The circuit court granted Hodge's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment accordingly. Aggrieved, the Jacksons appeal and advance the following issue:
I. Are employees whose actions constitute a criminal offense afforded immunity under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2)?
Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
. On April 28, 1999, the Jacksons were involved in an automobile collision with Hodge. Hodge was driving a car owned by her brother, Anthony Webb. The Jacksons attempted to negotiate a settlement with Hodge's insurer for almost three years. Since the parties could not come to an agreement, the Jacksons filed their complaint.
. During discovery, the Jacksons learned that Hodge was working for Singing River Mental Health Services at the time of the accident. Hodge's duties included driving Singing River patients around to help see to their personal needs. At the time of the collision with the Jacksons, Hodge was returning a patient to the patient's home after helping the patient with some errands. As a condition to her employment, Hodge had to furnish her own vehicle and insure her vehicle.
. When Hodge filed her motion for summary judgment, she claimed that she was employed by a governmental entity and that any action against her failed because the Jacksons did not comply with the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
. This Court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment. Reynolds v. Amerada Hess Corp., 778 So.2d 759 ( 9) (Miss. 2000). Thus, this Court applies the same standard that the trial court employed under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. (citing 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2716 (1983 & Supp. 1988)). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the non-moving party is to be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Id. Hodge bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists. Id. However, this burden is one of production and persuasion, not of proof. Id. (citing Fruchter v. Lynch Oil Co., 522 So.2d 195, 198 (Miss.1988)). Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 56(c)). "This Court does not try issues on a Rule 56 motion, it only determines whether there are issues to be tried." Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 56 cmt.).
ANALYSIS
I. Are employees whose actions constitute a criminal offense afforded immunity under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(2)?
. The Jacksons argue that the circuit court erred in granting Hodge's motion for summary judgment because, as a matter of law, Hodge is not entitled to protection under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. According to the Jacksons, Hodge is not entitled to immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act because Hodge was not acting in the course and scope of her employment when she ran a stop sign. The Jacksons claim that Hodge could not be acting in the course and
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