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Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams Co.9/6/2005
en the cause of action accrued, for it is at the moment of accrual that the clock begins to run on the statute of limitations.
. Pollard and Trellvion argue that the trial court erred in finding that their claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Pollard and Trellvion assert that although they learned in 1993 that Trellvion had tested positive for excessive exposure to lead, they were not aware that Trellvion had been injured until Pollard was told of the causal connection by their expert witness, Dr. Litsky, in January 2003. Pollard and Trellvion argue that the issue of whether the statute of limitations was a bar to their claims was a question for the jury to determine. See Schiro v. American Tobacco Co., 611 So. 2d 962 (Miss. 1992); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704 (Miss. 1990); Cannon v. Mid-South X-Ray Co., 738 So. 2d 274 (MisS.Ct. App. 1999).
. Sherwin-Williams maintains that Pollard and Trellvion's claims were barred pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. §§ 15-1-49 (1) and (2) (Rev. 2003). Sherwin-Williams argues that Pollard was aware of Trellvion's injury when he was diagnosed with excessive exposure to lead in 1993. Specifically, Sherwin-Williams asserts that Pollard was aware of Trellvion's excessive exposure to lead in 1993 and that she was aware in 1994 that it was allegedly caused by ingesting lead-based paint when she was told this fact by her mother. Sherwin-Williams maintains that Pollard and Trellvion's claims accrued no later than 1994 and that the statute of limitations expired by 1997; this was more than three years before these claims were filed on November 28, 2000. Sherwin-Williams further asserts that knowledge of the cause of an injury is not needed to trigger the statute of limitations; rather, a claim accrues upon knowledge of the injury or disease. Edwards, 573 So. 2d at 709.
. Before proceeding with our analysis, we pause to address the standard of review. A motion for summary judgment should only be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact. M.R.C.P. 56(c). This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment. Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532, Order of Moose, Inc., 641 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Miss. 1994). All evidentiary matters are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Morgan v. City of Ruleville, 627 So. 2d 275, 277 (Miss. 1993). In other words, accepting the facts offered by Pollard and Trellvion as true, the record must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the question of when Pollard and Trellvion's claims accrued.
. We agree that §§ 15-1-49 (1) and (2) apply as to these claims. Section 15-1-49 (1) states that " ll actions for which no period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three . . . years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after." Furthermore, § 15-1-49 (2) states that " n all actions . . . which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury."
. Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court has specifically held that the discovery rule exists in cases of a negligence or products liability cause of action involving latent injury and that "the cause of action accrues and the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff can reasonably be held to have knowledge of the injury or disease." Edwards, 573 So. 2d at 709. The Edwards decision clearly established an objective standard of reasonable knowledge for determining when these types of causes of action accrue.
. We acknowledge at the outset that Pollard and Trellvion are correct in their
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