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DML8/23/2005
e changes in multiple claim cases. We also quoted that portion of the comments which states that § 25-2-116, MCA, is necessary to prevent a plaintiff from controlling venue by adding spurious claims that have little or no validity, but are triable in the forum the plaintiff chooses rather than at the normal situs which would be the defendant's residence or another location more favorable to the defendant.
We then observed that, since a wrongful death claim and a survivorship claim must be combined in one action, there was little likelihood that a plaintiff would spuriously add one claim to another simply to defeat a venue favorable to the defendant and the evil § 25-2-116, MCA, seeks to address is not present in those sorts of cases. Wentz, 280 Mont. at 22, 928 P.2d at 241-42. Finally, observing we had addressed and rejected a similar argument in Gabriel, we concluded § 25-2-116, MCA, did not apply to the case. Wentz, 280 Mont. at 22, 928 P.2d at 242.
Tracing back to Gabriel, on which we relied heavily in Wentz, I note first that we did not address the impact of § 25-2-116, MCA, on venue in wrongful death/survivorship actions in Gabriel. Indeed, the statute is not even cited in the case. Thus, Gabriel was--and is--of no assistance in interpreting § 25-2-116, MCA. Second, I agree with Justice Leaphart's concurrence in Wentz that, although the intent behind § 25-2-116, MCA, may have been to preclude a plaintiff from manipulating venue by adding spurious claims, that intent is not incorporated in the statute. Wentz, 280 Mont. at 23-24, 928 P.2d at 243 (Leaphart, J., concurring). The plain language of the statute reveals that it applies to any action involving two or more claims; no reference to spurious claims or attempts to manipulate venue exists. Moreover, as Justice Leaphart observed, where the intent of a statute may be determined from the plain meaning of the language used, this Court may not resort to legislative history or other means of construction such as the Commission's comments to the statute. See Wentz, 280 Mont. at 24, 928 P.2d at 243 (Leaphart, J., concurring). As a result, it is my view that Wentz incorrectly interpreted and applied § 25-2-116, MCA. Even taking the Evidence Commission's comments to § 25-2-116, MCA, into account, the Commission stated as follows:
This new provision codifies the result of this unbroken line of opinions: Yore v. Murphy, 10 Mont. 304, 25 P. 1039 (1891); Heinecke v. Scott, 95 Mont. 200, 26 P.2d 167 (1933); Beavers v. Rankin, 142 Mont. 570, 385 P.2d 640 (1963). It makes no change in existing law, but simply enacts it into the Code where it is available. (Emphasis added.) None of the three cases cited by the Commission held that the statute was limited in application to only those situations where a plaintiff was manipulating venue by adding spurious claims.
In Liang, the plaintiff had worked in two restaurants, one located in Flathead County and the other in Sanders County. The plaintiff filed an eleven-count complaint in Flathead County against the owners of the restaurants. Some of the counts related to alleged injuries the plaintiff suffered as a result of a slip and fall accident at the Flathead County restaurant; those counts alleged the owners negligently failed to maintain the premises. The remaining counts alleged various wage claims relating to his employment at both restaurants. Liang, 3 and 4. The district court granted the defendants' motion to change venue to Sanders County and the plaintiff appealed. We reversed. Liang, 1.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that venue for the majority of the claims in the complaint was proper in Flathead County, although he did concede that proper venue for so
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